Pace International Law Review
Volume 27
Issue 1 Commercial Edition
Spring 2015

Article 2

April 2015

Transportation, Cooperation and Harmonization: GATS as a
Gateway to Integrating the UN Seaborne Cargo Regimes into the
WTO
Lijun Zhao
Middlesex University (U.K.), l.zhao@mdx.ac.uk

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, International Law Commons, International Trade
Law Commons, Law of the Sea Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lijun Zhao, Transportation, Cooperation and Harmonization: GATS as a Gateway to Integrating
the UN Seaborne Cargo Regimes into the WTO, 27 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 60 (2015)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol27/iss1/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace International Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

2. LIJUN ZHAO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/20/15 10:31 PM

TRANSPORTATION, COOPERATION AND
HARMONIZATION: GATS AS A GATEWAY
TO INTEGRATING THE UN SEABORNE
CARGO REGIMES INTO THE WTO
Lijun Zhao*
ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to analyze how the World Trade Organization
(WTO) may cooperate with the United Nations (UN) to unify seaborne cargo regimes. Beginning with the current dilemma of uniform maritime transport regime, the paper explores the relationship between the UN and the WTO. In light of the successful
precedent of the incorporation of the UN intellectual property regime into the WTO, this paper probes into the feasibility that the
UN and the WTO may interactively unify a maritime transport
regime by reference to selected previous treaties, which include
UN-administrated treaties. This paper argues the WTO-based
sea transport negotiations do not start from a zero basis so that it
can be traced backwards to negotiating the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS). Having scrutinized the progress
and regress in the negotiations so far under the WTO framework,
this paper stresses the potential role of an annex on sea transport
to the GATS so as to address the issue of harmonization.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Maritime transport is a significant facilitator of world
trade with approximately four-fifths of goods (by volume) being
carried by sea and is an important service sector that makes
significant contributions to some national Gross Domestic
1
Products (GDP). Concerning the harmonization of the maritime transport regime, the literature is unevenly focused on the
United Nations (UN) and the world trading system (including
the predecessor General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
2
(GATT) system and the current World Trade Organization
3
4
(WTO) system. Traditionally, the harmonization of the maritime transport regimes have been negotiated under the UN,
* Lecturer in law, Middlesex University, the United Kingdom; Fellow of
the Society of Legal Scholars, and the British Institute of International and
Comparative Law. LL.B. and LL.M (China University of Political Science and
Law), PhD (University of Wales, Bangor). Research interest: WTO, maritime
and commercial law; Email: l.zhao@mdx.ac.uk. An early draft of this paper
combined with economic justification for the unification of transport law has
been presented at the Forums of National University of Ireland and the (British) Society of Legal Scholars, thanks to Professors D. Rhidian Thomas and
Wei Shi and their enlightening comments for this paper.
1
Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Communication
from Australia, Canada, Chile, the People’s Republic of China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Estonia, The European Communities and their Member States, Gambia, Georgia, Guatemala, Hong Kong,
China, Iceland, India, Japan, The Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Slovenia, Switzerland, and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,
Kinmen and Matsu, TN/S/W/11, at 1 (March 3, 2003).
2
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/
gatt47_01_e.htm [hereinafter GATT]; see generally The GATT Years: From
Havana to Marrakesh, WTO (2013), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (GATT, which was replaced by the WTO in 1995,
was a provisional agreement that entered into force in January 1948 and was
designed to be terminated by the treaty creating the International Trade Organization (ITO). However, the ITO had not come into force, so the GATT was
continued and integrated into the WTO in 1995).
3
See generally GATT, supra note 2 (The GATT system was incorporated
into the WTO system in 1995. The GATT has two meanings: first it was a
provisional agreement (GATT 1947) that entered into force in January 1948;
second, the GATT was a predecessor (machinery) which was imparted into
the WTO system in 1995.
4
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm.

3
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but the UN framework has demonstrated shortcomings in fulfilling this task. Although the UN endeavors to foster a uni5
form regime by drafting the Rotterdam Rules, it will not easily
6
7
replace the earlier effective conventions of The Hague, Visby,
8
9
and Hamburg Rules to form a uniform regime worldwide.
Moreover, the UN system of enforcement does not have the
administrative framework at the international level to safe10
guard the application of these seaborne cargo conventions.
Enormous emphasis has been placed on analyzing UN
11
treaties; little scholarship, however, has been devoted to the
harmonization of the maritime transport regime under the
12
WTO. Moreover, there has been no literature looking at the
WTO’s capacity to address issues of harmonizing sea transport.
Due to wide participation and a center-administrated implementation system, the WTO can make up these two pitfalls
of the current UN approach to harmonization – restricted scope
of coverage and the lack of central administration in implementation. The aim of this paper is to refocus on the WTO. The paper will examine the feasibility of harmonizing international
sea transport regimes through cooperation between the UN
and the WTO in the following three sections:
Section II will briefly compare and contrast the UN system
5
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage
of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, G.A. Res. 63/122, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/122
(Dec. 11, 2008) [hereinafter Rotterdam Rules].
6
Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 [hereinafter Hague
Rules].
7
Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Feb. 23, 1968, 1412 U.N.T.S
121 [hereinafter Visby Rules].
8
United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Mar. 31,
1978, 1695 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Hamburg Rules].
9
See, e.g., Anthony Diamond, The Rotterdam Rules, LLOYD’S MAR. AND
COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY 445, 535 (2009).
10
Pascal Lamy, The Place of the WTO and its Law in the International
Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 969, 982 (2006).
11
See Comité Maritime International, Bibliography on the Rotterdam
Rules (2013); e.g. Anthony Diamond, The Rotterdam Rules, Lloyd’s Maritime
and Commercial Law Quarterly 445–536 (2009).
12
See generally Benjamin Parameswaran, The Liberalization of Maritime
Transport Services: With Special Reference to the WTO/GATS Framework
(2004); J. Michael Taylor, Evaluating the Continuing GATS Negotiations
Concerning International Maritime Transport Services, 27 Tul. Mar. L. J.
129-95 (2002).
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and the world trading system from the perspective of sea cargo
transport.
Section III will demonstrate the feasibility of the harmonization of the sea transport regime under the WTO without
prejudice to the UN’s respective conventions. The WTO has
successfully harmonized the intellectual property (IP) regime
13
that is similar to sea transport law, as they have five aspects
14
in common. Thus, a successful precedent from the “Trade15
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement” (TRIPS)
sheds light on the unification of sea transport law under the
16
world trading system. Accordingly, an approach of selective
reference, in which the WTO cooperates with the UN and unifies the IP regime, will fulfill the task of harmonizing maritime
transport law.
With respect to the historical connection between the WTO
and sea transport, Section IV will argue that the maritime
transport negotiations at the WTO negotiating forum does not
start from a zero basis. Section IV will further evaluate the history of WTO maritime transport related negotiations under the
17
“General Agreement on Trade in Services” (GATS), produce
progress upon which further negotiations can be built on, and
identify setbacks that was problematic and that needed to be
18
amended in further negotiations.

13

Sea transport conventions and the intellectual property rights conventions are under the UN administration. See, e.g., Visby Rules, supra note 7;
see also TRIPS Agreement, infra note 15.
14
See infra Part III. IP in the section Cooperation between the WTO and
the UN.
15
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf.
16
See infra Part III.
17
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1 B, 1869
U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf.
18
See infra Part IV; see also Special Session of the Council for Trade in
Services, Decision on Maritime Transport Services, S/L/94 at 1 (July 3, 1996)
(providing the suspension and resumption of the negotiations on maritime
transport services).
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II. COMPARISON OF TWO APPROACHES TO UNIFY TRANSPORT
LAW: THE WTO AND THE UN
A. Multi-Forums of Shipping Related Negotiations and the
Need to Harmonize
Although they are two independent organizations, the
WTO and the UN actively connect to each other. The emergence of the world trading system 19 can be traced back to
20
1947. In that year, the UN’s Conference of Trade and Employment adopted the Havana Charter for the International
21
Trade Organization (ITO) that aimed to establish a multilat22
eral trade organization. Although the ITO never came into
force, the Havana Charter was partially integrated into the
23
WTO.
Furthermore, the cooperation between the two organizations is deeply rooted in the WTO agreements. In general, the
legal basis of the WTO-UN relation is governed by the “Arrangements for Effective Cooperation with Other Intergovernmental Organizations-Relations between the WTO and the
24
UN.” Additionally, the GATS and GATT, two cardinal components of the WTO Agreements, specify collaborative relation25
ships with other international organizations, which provide
19

For a summary of the function and history of the GATT, see John H.
Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence 1535 (1998) (discussing the strengths and limitations of the WTO and how it
will need to adapt to meet new demands from the perspectives of the constitutional structure and dispute settlement procedures); see also John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT & The WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and
Economic Relations 408-10 (2000).
20
See United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana,
Cuba, Nov. 21, 1947- Mar. 24, 1948, Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.2/78 (1948) [hereinafter
Havana Charter], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Compare id. with GATT, supra note 2. (The chapter on Commercial
Policy within the Havana Charter was integrated into the GATT (1948) system).
24
Arrangements for Effective Cooperation with Other Intergovernmental
Organizations-Relations between the WTO and the United Nations, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/wto_un_e.htm, (governing the
WTO-UN relation, which was signed on 15 November 1995 in the same year
as the WTO established).
25
See GATS, supra note 17, art. XXVI (providing “The General Council
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the legal basis for the cooperation with the UN and its specialized agencies on shipping.
In considering the multi-forum maritime transport, it is
worthwhile to boost further cooperation. There are a number of
26
UN specialized agencies handling shipping issues. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
27
(UNCTAD), Organization for Economic Co-operation and De28
velopment (OECD), and United Nations Economic and Social
29
Council (ECOSOC) have published statistical data on the
30
shipping industry for years. These are considerable resources
of background information for further GATS-based maritime
transport negotiations. For example, UNCTAD has published
31
“The Review of Maritime Transport” yearly since 1968. Moreover, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United
Nations
Commission
on
International
Trade
Law
32
(UNCITRAL), and the International Maritime Organization

shall make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with
the United Nations and its specialized agencies as well as with other intergovernmental organizations concerned with services.”); see also GATT, supra
note 2, art. XXXVI(7) (stating “There is need for appropriate collaboration between the CONTRACTING PARTIES, other intergovernmental bodies and
the organs and agencies of the United Nations system, whose activities relate
to the trade and economic development of less-developed countries.”).
26
See e.g. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switz., Mar. 23-Jun. 16, 1964: Final Act and Report, U.N. Doc.
E/CONF.46/141, Vol. I (1964) [hereinafter UNCTAD]; see generally Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, available at
http://www.oecd.org. (China is not an OECD country); United Nations, Econ.
& Soc. Council, U.N. Doc. E/1849/Add.1 (1950) [hereinafter ECOSOC]. (These
entities have different legal basis, governance structures, funding, mandates
and scopes.).
27
See UNCTAD, supra note 26.
28
See OECD, supra note 26.
29
See ECOSOC, supra note 26.
30
See, e.g., REVIEW OF MAR. TRANSPORT (SERIES) (2013), available at
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/Publications/Review-of-Maritime-Transport%28Series%29.aspx (UNCTAD has been publishing Maritime Transport Review since 1968. The maritime related statistical data are also published in
the OECD website).
31
Id.
32
Establishment of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law, G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6594
(Dec. 17, 1966) [hereinafter UNCITRAL]; International Transport of Goods,
UNCITRAL, (2013),
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods.html.
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33

(IMO) deal with various aspects of shipping, for example,
34
35
seamen, the international sea cargo regime, and interna36
tional sale of goods. Amongst these specialized agencies, the
Working Group III (on transport law) of UNCITRAL mainly
37
works on the harmonization of the sea cargo regime with the
assistance of a private international organization - the Com38
mittee Maritime International (CMI).
On the other hand, the WTO possesses two advantages
over other forums on reinforcing harmonization of shipping re39
gimes. This study focuses on the sea cargo regime and
UNCITRAL, but the proposed way of cooperation in this paper
might be extended to other respective shipping areas. First, the
nature of legal documents administered by UNCITRAL and by
the WTO is dramatically distinct. Most WTO agreements (including the GATS and TRIPS) are multilateral and legally
40
binding for all members, but the UNCITRAL-administrated
41
conventions can be regarded as plurilateral agreements. Unlike multilateral agreements, the category of plurilateral
agreements is optionally applicable to UNCITRAL negotiating
33
Convention on the International Maritime Organization, Geneva,
Switz., Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 621, 289 U.N.T.S. 48 (1948) [hereinafter IMO].
34
See id.
35
See UNCITRAL, supra note 32; see Rotterdam Rules, supra note 5; see
Hamburg Rules, supra note 8.
36
See International Sale of Goods (CISG) & Related Transactions,
UNCITRAL (2013),
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitral_texts/sale_goods.html.
37
See International Transport of Goods, supra note 32.
38
See CMI History, COMITÉ MARITIME INTERNATIONAL (2010),
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Home/0,271,1132,00.html (stating that CMI
was established in 1897 before the UN); F.L. Wiswall, A Brief History,
COMITÉ MAR. INT’L, http://www.comitemaritime.org/A-BriefHistory/0,27139,113932,00.html (2010) (The CMI drafted the Rotterdam
Rules for the UNCITRAL Working Group III).
39
This study focuses on the sea cargo regime and UNCITRAL, but the
cooperation might be extended to other shipping areas.
40
See John H. Jackson, The World trading system - Law and Policy of International Economic Relations 47-48 (MIT, 1997).
41
Jerome H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual
Property Protection under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
23, 29 & n.39 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 2d ed. 2008) (discussing the difference between plurilateral and multilateral agreements. The
term “plurilateral agreement” is used in the WTO. Unlike a multilateral
agreement, a plurilateral agreement implies that WTO members would be
given the choice to agree to new rules on a voluntary basis.).
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countries on a voluntary basis, and is only binding for those
42
members who ratify the treaties. Moreover, UNCITRAL has
also adopted additional legislative techniques in modernizing
43
and harmonizing the law of international trade. Several different types of legislative texts are used on the basis of its
mandate, including conventions, model laws, legislative guides
44
and model provisions. Among these legislative texts, only the
45
conventions are binding. As the maritime transport regimes,
46
47
48
49
The Hague, Visby, Hamburg and Rotterdam Rules do not
automatically apply to their negotiating countries, and their
50
applications reply on ratifications.
In contrast, the second category of multilateral treaties
consists of agreements that are compulsorily binding on all
members, and WTO agreements mainly belong to this catego51
ry. Thus, a WTO-based maritime transport regime is legally
52
binding and likely to be applicable to all WTO Members. Due
42
Id.; see also United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (New York, 2008),
UNCITRAL (2013),
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/rotterdam
_status.html (displaying the status and numbers of ratifications of the Rotterdam Rules.).
43
See U.N. Secretary-General, Question of Coordination: Direction of the
Work of the Commission, ¶¶ 99-122, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/203 (May 13, 1981);
see also U.N. Secretariat, Alternative Methods for the Final Adoption of Conventions Emanating from the Work of the Commission, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/204 (May 21, 1981).
44
See A Guide to UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL (2013),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/12-57491-Guide-toUNCITRAL-e.pdf.
45
Id. at 13. (“To become a party to a convention, States are required formally to deposit a binding instrument of ratification or accession with the depositary (for conventions prepared by UNCITRAL, the Secretary - General of
the United Nations)”).
46
See MICHAEL F. STURLEY, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CARRIAGE OF
GOODS BY SEA ACT AND THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE HAGUE RULES
(1990) (discussing the adoption of the Hague Rules).
47
See Allan I. Mendelsohn, Why The U.S. Did Not Ratify The Visby
Amendments, 23 J. MAR. L. & COM. 29 (1992) (discussing the refusal of adoption of the Visby Rules).
48
See Hamburg Rules, supra note 8.
49
See Rotterdam Rules, supra note 5.
50
See Rotterdam Rules, supra note 5; see Hague Rules, supra note 6; see
Visby Rules, supra note 7, See Hamburg Rules, supra note 8.
51
Reichman, supra note 41, at 46.
52
See Members and Observers, WTO (Apr. 26, 2015),
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53

to all WTO Agreements being a single package, both substantive norms within the GATS and its procedural enforcement
system will apply to all Members. The nature of a WTOadministrated maritime transport annex is if a uniform sea
cargo regime is part of the annex, it is a multilateral agreement
and is significantly different from The Hague, Visby, Hamburg,
54
and Rotterdam Rules.
The WTO has built up the widest coverage of Members and
55
application of scope. Governing over 161 Members, the WTO
engages in over 90 percent of all international trade in goods
56
and services. It is comprehensive in the composition of its
membership, including all developed countries and almost all
57
developing countries. There are few other legal frameworks
that are better at promoting the multilateral negotiations on
the trade of goods and related maritime transport services. The
WTO framework covers the broadest spectrum of Members and
almost all stages of development of economic entities from de58
veloped nations to less developed countries. Therefore, a
WTO-based maritime transport agreement will likely become
59
binding for all WTO Members globally.
Due to its minimal political image, the WTO has earned
60
great prestige over the developing world. In order to establish
the WTO as a unified institution under the WTO Agreements,
there were a variety of clearly unanswered issues after the con61
clusion of the Uruguay Round of negotiations. These issues
62
entailed further negotiations on services and greater integrahttp://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (Stating that
there have been 161 WTO members).
53
Jackson, supra note 40, at 47.
54
See Rotterdam Rules, supra note 5; see Hague Rules, supra note 6; see
Visby Rules, supra note 7; see Hamburg Rules, supra note 8.
55
GATS - Fact and Fiction, WTO, at 2 (2001)
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsfacts1004_e.pdf.
56
See Members and Observers, supra note 52.
57
See id.
58
See id.
59
See JACKSON supra note 40; see Reichman supra note 41 (It is the nature of multilateral agreements.)
60
J. Michael Taylor, Evaluating the Continuing GATS Negotiations Concerning International Maritime Transport Services, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 129,
180-81 (2002).
61
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND
JURISPRUDENCE 40 (1998).
62
See id.
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63

tion of developing countries, as well as monitoring of the
64
WTO rules to ensure fair treatment of these countries the
problem of integrating the “economies in transition” into the
65
WTO system, and facing up to the problem of “state trading”
66
entities.
B. Harmonization: WTO’s Liberalization and UN’s Unification
Both the UN and the WTO aim at the harmonization of the
maritime transport regime, but each does so with different focuses. The UN stresses the unification of the sea cargo re67
68
gime. As seen from the full name of the Hague Rules, the
UN harmonization is targeted at establishing and updating
universal rules for a wide range of countries. The WTO emphasizes Members’ deeper commitment in existing sectors to
69
achieve further liberalization. Meanwhile, the WTO does not
intervene in its Members’ regulatory autonomy over quality
control of services supplied and the standardization of the ser70
vice regulation worldwide. Both the WTO and the UN try to
adjust diverse levels of domestic regulations to universal levels
set by them. The UN’s unification and the WTO’s harmonization are both targeted towards global application and the level
of standardization affects whether the scope of application
71
could become global or not. Therefore, the harmonization of
63

See id. at 41.
See Who are the Developing Countries in the WTO?, WTO (2013),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm; see also Leastdeveloped Countries, WTO (2013),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm (discussing
developing countries and less developed countries in WTO; Contrasted with
some other service sectors, the developed countries usually have less control
on shipping sector than do the developed world.).
65
See JACKSON, supra note 61 at 41.
66
See id.
67
From the full name of the Hamburg and Rotterdam Rules, which are
negotiated under the UN.
68
The “Hague Rules” stands for the “International Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading”; see Hague
Rules, supra note 6.
69
See GATS supra note 17 pmbl.
70
Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl and Pierre Sauvé, GATS and the Regulation of International Trade in Services: World Trade Forum, at 3, 5-6, (2008).
71
See Rotterdam Rules, supra note 5; see Hague Rules, supra note 6; see
Visby Rules, supra note 7; see Hamburg Rules, supra note 8 (showing the status of the Hamburg and Rotterdam Rules, in comparison with the numbers of
64
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the UN and of the WTO faces a question: which levels of the
standardization should be imposed on the UN’s unification and
the WTO’s liberalization? In general, the standard of unification on limiting freedom of contract should be relatively low; in
contrast, the standard of the WTO’s liberalization seems to be
72
higher.
Nonetheless, the standardization is harmonized at different levels under unification and liberalization. The level of unification of the different cargo regimes is balanced between low
and high levels and regards the scope of application and liability. Additionally, the level for liberalization sets the standard
at a relatively high level requiring removing unnecessary regulations, but the high standards are achievable through progres73
sive liberalization. Moreover, both targets of liberalization
and unification can be achieved under the WTO framework.
According to GATS Preamble, the WTO’s liberalization of shipping markets can be achieved without prejudice to UN’s unifi74
cation of the sea cargo regime. In practice, TRIPS proves that
the WTO is capable of unifying different domestic regulations
and liberalizing markets in one go.
III. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE WTO AND THE UN: FROM
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TO TRANSPORTATION
The WTO is setting a creative precedent to include IP re75
gimes into the world trading system through TRIPS. This
precedent opens a door for individuals’ private rights to be
merged into the WTO system. Taking into account the four aspects that IP shares with maritime transport, it is feasible to
include maritime transport in the TRIPS’s counterpart GATS.
First, TRIPS and the GATS are Annexes 1B and 1C at the
76
same level of the pyramid of the WTO Agreements. Second,
ratifications. It shows that the increasing number of articles tends to cause
the deceasing number of ratifications.).
72
Alberto Bercovitz, Copyright and Related Rights, in Intellectual Property and International Trade: The TRIPS Agreement 125-145 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 2nd ed. 2008).
73
See GATS supra note 17, Part IV.
74
See GATS supra note 17 pmbl.
75
See WTO supra note 15.
76
See WTO, supra note 15; see also WTO Legal Texts, infra note 82
(showing the relationship of these Agreements in the chart on Annex 1B and
Annex 1C).
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the implementation of TRIPS and the GATS are both safeguarded by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding at
77
an international level. Third, both the IP and sea transport
liability regimes are concerned with balancing rights and obligations between private entities, such as rights holders and
78
late comers in IP, and the hull and cargo interest individuals
79
and companies in the sea transport. Fourth, both regimes
80
came into being before the establishment of the UN, and
there were respective international conventions prior to the UN
81
conventions. Addressing the relationships between the preUN conventions and the UN-administrated conventions under
TRIPS was an unavoidable task for IP harmonization. Likewise, the GATS will provide a vehicle for harmonizing the maritime transport regime, which entails addressing the relationships between previous conventions, including the UNadministrated conventions. On account of the four shared merits of IP and maritime transport, five successful aspects of IP’s
inclusion will be investigated in depth to shed light on maritime transport’s inclusion into the WTO/GATS.
Figure 1: WTO Agreements

77

See WTO supra note 15, Annex 2.
See generally Reichman, supra note 41.
79
See Diamond, supra note 9 at 535.
80
See generally UN at a Glance, UN, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/ (last
visited Sept. 30, 2013) (stating that the UN was established in 1945). See infra note 84 and note 85 (The IP conventions, such as the Paris Convention,
were concluded in the 19th century); see supra note 6 and note 7 (The sea cargo conventions were negotiated in the beginning of the 20th century).
81
See e.g., Hague Rules, supra note 6.
78

13

2. LIJUN ZHAO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

5/20/15 10:31 PM

TRANSPORTATION, COOPERATION

73

*Figure drawn up by the author.
The Figure above illustrates the umbrella-shape of the
WTO and the single-package concept.82
A. Cooperation between the UN agencies and the WTO: WIPO
and Council for TRIPS; UNCITRAL and Council for Trade in
Services
Patents and copyrights are two primary intellectual prop83
erty regimes. By the end of the nineteenth century the “Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property” (the Paris
84
Convention) and the “Berne Convention for the Protection of
85
Literal and Artistic Works” (the Berne Convention) had been
created to provide protection on the two categories of IP rights
86
at the transnational level. Both treaties and their revisions
are administered by a United Nations special agency – the
87
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Although
revised, these pre-GATT conventions on IP rights did not de88
velop as quickly as did the advent of the digital age. The new
89
circumstance entailed the emergence of an appropriate inter82

See the full texts of the Uruguay Rounds Agreements in WTO official
website, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm, accessed 18
February 2013.
83
Reichman, supra note 41, at 30, 44.
84
See generally The Paris Convention on Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter the Paris Convention],
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html.
85
See generally, Berne Convention on Literal and Artistic Works, September 9, 1896, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter the Berne Convention], available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html.
86
Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPS: Background, Principles and General Provisions, in INTELLECTUAL PROP. AND INT’L TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, 3, at
5. (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 2008).
87
Id.; see generally WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/portal/index.html.en (last
visited February 8, 2013).
88
See H. Kronstein & I. Till, A Reevaluation of the Int’l Patent Convention,12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 765, 768 (1947) (citing the letter of invitation
to the First International Congress for Consideration of Patent Protection
held in Vienna in 1872, which stated, “We live no longer in the day of Industrial action . . . We lived at a time . . . today a magnitude a generation ago one
could not have imagined. Under such altered relations the Patent granted for
an invention . . . becomes in fact a restriction unprofitable and obstructive . . .
Such and similar inconveniences can only be met by the common action of all
civilized Stated, disposed to the maintenance of Patent protection”); see generally Yusuf, supra note 86, at 7-8.
89
As to intellectual property at the digital age, the new circumstances re-
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national instrument that satisfied the technology creators.
Although the discrepancies between the developed and de91
veloping world on IP rights-protection were aggravated, it
was increasingly recognized as the justification for harmoniz92
ing the conflicts of international rules. Even though the United States (US) and the European Community (EC) proposed a
draft agreement on measures to discourage the importation of
93
counterfeit goods before the world trading system, the pro94
posal had not been adopted at the Tokyo Round; however, the
proposal triggered discussions for the adoption of TRIPS in the
world trading system through the early 1980’s and the Uru95
guay Round. As a result, the WTO became another institution, besides the WIPO, administrating the IP regime under
TRIPS. Thus, subsectors of the IP regime, including the patents, copyrights and respective IP rights, have been integrated
into TRIPS since the Uruguay Round.
In light of the WIPO-and-TRIPS case, this proves that an
area that is traditionally administrated by the UN can be adjusted by the WTO system. It also proves that the WTO can collaboratively cope with pre-existing conventions, including the
UN-administrated conventions. A WTO-based maritime
transport regime can coexist with pre-UN treaties and deal
with the harmonization of respective treaties together with the
UN approach. The area of IP rights was traditionally administrated solely by the WIPO and maritime transport before the
Uruguay Round negotiations was also administrated only by
the UN agencies. Nevertheless, TRIPS has added some more
ingredients to the IP negotiation forum and enforcement at the
WTO under the Council of TRIPS, which justifies considering
fer to novel technologies and inventions.
90
Yusuf, supra note 86, at 6-7.
91
See generally Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Prop. in Int’l Trade:
Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J OF TRANSNAT’L L.
747, 795-96 (1989); see also Yusuf, supra note 86, at 8.
92
See generally Kronstein & Till, supra note 88, at 768; Yusuf, supra note
86, at 7-8.
93
Yusuf, id., at 7.
94
See GATT Secretariat, Work Undertaken in GATT Concerning TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, MTN.GNG/NG/11/W/4 (May 6, 1987), available at
http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92020093.pdf.
95
Yusuf, supra note 86, at 7.
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the possibility of maritime transport being governed by both
systems. In addition, a GATS-based maritime transport annex
will make the regime apply to all WTO members, which will
make the maritime regime applicable worldwide as an IP regime under TRIPS.
B. The Conversion of UN-administrated Treaties into the WTO
Agreements through Selective References: TRIPS and the GATS
The TRIPS Agreement permits the enforcement of existing
instruments on IP rights, as long as such instruments were not
96
a restriction on international trade in disguise. The TRIPS
approach is permissive but cautious towards IP regulatory
97
measures hindering free trade and competition. Thus, appropriate levels of regulation for example, the carrier’s liability
98
under the UN treaties may be integrated into the GATS and
applicable at the worldwide level as long as they contain no
hindrance on liberalization and competition.
IP and sea transport conventions came into being before
99
the establishment of the UN and the world trading system.
100
101
Under the TRIPS Agreement and some pre-GATT, exist96

See GATT, supra note 2 at Art. XX(d) (explaining, “General Exceptions”
stipulates “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of
measures: […] (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including
those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopoly operated
under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents,
trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices”); see
Yusuf, supra note 86, at 8.
97
See Reichman, supra note 91, at 795-96 (noting, an paradox of the
GATT approach on regulations and free markets that the industrialized
countries with free domestic markets hoped to impose a highly regulated
market on intellectual goods on the rest of the world, and the developing
countries with restrictive free market preferred a totally unregulated international intellectual property regime); see Yusuf, supra note 86, at 8.
98
See, e.g., Hamburg Rules, supra note 8, at arts. 5, 6, and 8; Rotterdam
Rules, supra note 5 arts. 17, 24, 59, 60 & 61.
99
See generally Hague Rules, supra note 6; Visby Rules, supra note 7.
100
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15.
101
The GATT system was founded in 1947 and replaced by the WTO in
1995 after the Uruguay Round negotiations; see The GATT Years, supra note
2.
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ing IP conventions are creatively incorporated into the WTO
102
framework by selective reference. These previous international regimes embrace the Paris Convention (1967 rever103
104
sion), Berne Convention (1971 reversion), the “Washington
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Cir105
cuits” (IPIC), and the “Rome Convention for International
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations” (Rome Conven106
tion). However, a number of pre-existing IP conventions have
not been incorporated into TRIPS. For instance the “International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants”
107
108
(UPOV), and WIPO “Copyright Treaty” (WCT), the WIPO
102
See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 2, 9 & 35 (stating, “1. In respect of Parts II, III and IV of this Agreement, Members shall
comply with Articles 1-12 and 19 of the Paris Convention (1967). 2. Nothing
in Parts I to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations
that Members may have to each other under the Paris Convention, the Berne
Convention, the Rome Convention and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in
Respect of Integrated Circuits”. TRIPS Agreement Article 9, “Relation to the
Berne Convention,” reads as, “1. Members shall comply with Articles 1
through 21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto. However, Members shall not have rights or obligations under this Agreement in
respect of the rights conferred under Article 6 of that Convention or of the
rights derived there from. 2. Copyright protection shall extend to expressions
and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts
as such.”; TRIPS Agreement Article 35, “Relation to the IPIC Treaty,” reads
as, “Members agree to provide protection to the layout-designs (topographies)
of integrated circuits (referred to in this Agreement as “layout-designs”) in
accordance with Articles 2 through 7 (other than paragraph 3 of Article 6),
Article 12 and paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits and, in addition, to comply with the following provisions.”).
103
Paris Convention, supra note 84 (Its latest revision is under the WIPO
administration but not WTO/TRIPS.).
104
Berne Convention, supra note 85. (Its latest revision is under the
WIPO administration but not WTO/TRIPS.).
105
See Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits,
May 26, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1477 (1989), available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/washington/pdf/trtdocs_w
o011.pdf.
106
See International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496
U.N.T.S 44 (1961), available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/rome/trtdocs_wo024.html.
107
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 109, revised by 33 U.S.T.
2703 (1978), revised by 815 U.N.T.S. 89 (1991) [hereinafter UPOV].
108
See WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996,
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109

“Performances and Phonograms Treaty” (WPPT).
In addition, only some articles of these aforementioned conventions
and only some of these specific revised versions and not the
110
latest revision, are incorporated into the WTO/TRIPS. It is
not unusual for treaties of a technical character to be amended
or revised often. But, the Paris and Berne Conventions have
111
been revised several times. TRIPS, however, does not refer to
112
the latest version, but to a specific revision of them.
The “selective referencing approach” has a backwards looking, threefold merits: a selective revised version, selected predecessor conventions, and selective articles within such a con113
vention.
In this way, parts of a number of earlier IP
conventions, for example the Paris Convention (1967 version)
and Berne Convention (1971 version), are made applicable
through TRIPS to WTO Members, which might not adopt these
114
conventions. Due to the broad coverage of the WTO member115
ship,
TRIPS indirectly extends the applicable coverage of
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html.
109
See WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), Dec. 20,
1996, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html.
110
See TRIPS Agreement arts. 3.1, & 4(b). National treatment and the
most-favoured-nation clauses apply only to those rights under the Rome Conventions that the TRIPS Agreement selectively provides, but not to rights
generally flowing from that Convention.
111
See Revisions and Contacting countries of Paris Convention and Berne
Convention, WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html.
112
See TRIPS Agreement, arts. 2, 9 and 35.
113
Cf Jerome H. Reichman, The Know-How Gap in the Gap in the TRIPS
Agreement: Why Software Fared Badly, and What Are the Solutions, 17
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 763, 765 (1995) (arguing both the strengths and
weaknesses of the TRIPS Agreement stem from its essentially backwardslooking character: on one hand, the TRIPS traced back to the earlier conventions; on the other hand, it also leaves gaps and loopholes, especially in nontraditional objects of intellectual goods, such as computer programs and biotechnology). See also Reichman, supra note 41, at 43 (discussing the shortcomings of backwards looking character on computer programs and electronic
information tools in information age).
114
Yusuf, supra note 86, at 20-21 (analysing the relationship between
TRIPs and the Intellectual Property Conventions on the basis of these two
articles, and he argues the twofold aims of the articles are first to incorporates the pre-existing conventions into the TRIPs Agreement and to express
the intention of the WTO parties to TRIPS Agreement to maintain in force
the obligations which member parties to related earlier conventions may
have to each other under the provisions of these conventions).
115
There have been 161 WTO members by 26 April 2015; see WTO Membership, WTO,
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116

these pre-GATT IP conventions.
The selective referencing approach helps TRIPS avoid potential conflicts with former international treaties and with the
UN to a large extent. TRIPS expresses an intention to maintain in force the obligations that WTO Members already have
117
under the earlier conventions. Such a clear declaration is
important in successive treaties governing the same subject
matter, especially in the case that any two treaties are binding
118
upon a different group of parties. This intention is to maintain the obligations already in force and to avoid the conflicting
obligations for a WTO member, which already ratifies a pre119
exiting convention. Therefore, a Member to an earlier treaty
and another Member that had contracted to both the treaty
and TRIPS are subject to all the provisions of the treaty.
Concerning shipping regimes, the selective referencing approach will reduce conflict with the Members of earlier treaties
and make a respective regime under the GATS feasible. There
are two important effective conventions with respect to seaborne cargo carriage: The Hague and Visby Rules. These were
120
drafted before the 1970s, but they must be updated to keep
121
up with technological changes after their conclusion. Containers had been used in shipping by the end of the late
122
1950s, and they become widely used in the 1970s.123 The sighttp://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm, (last visited
May 5, 2015).
116
TRIPS, as a multilateral agreement, make the referred conventions
become part of the TRIPS Agreement itself and be applicable to all 161 WTO
members. However, the number of countries, which ratified such a convention, is less than 161; see WIPO, supra note 111.
117
See TRIPS Agreement arts. 2.2 and 70. Article 2 entitled “Intellectual
Property Conventions” states “2. Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement
shall derogate from existing obligations that Members may have to each other under the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention
and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.”
Article 70.1 provides “This [TRIPS] Agreement does not give rise to obligations in respect of acts which occurred before the date of application of the
Agreement for the Member in question.”
118
Yusuf, supra note 86, at 21.
119
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 2.2.
120
See generally Hague Rules, supra note 6; Visby Rules, supra note 7.
121
Edward Schmeltzer & Robert A. Peavy, Prospects and Problems of the
Container Revolution, 1 J. MAR. L. & COM. 203, 210-11 (1970).
122
José Angelo Estrella Faria, Uniform Law for International Transport
at UNCITRAL: New Times, New Players, and New Rules, 44 TEX. INT’L L.J.
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nificant step toward modernized shipping was achieved by the
emergence of the container.124 However, these new situations
125
have not been embodied in the Hague and Visby Rules. Even
though the UN has tried to update sea transport regimes with
this trend through the Hamburg Rules and Rotterdam Rules
126
since the 1970s, these Rules have not been as widely adopted
127
as their predecessors. Even though they have been updat128
ed, the Rotterdam Rules do not allow contracting countries
to opt out of any chapter, which increases the difficulty in
129
achieving wide spread adoption. A possible way to make the
best use of previous negotiations is to refer to Articles of these
Conventions, no matter whether they are applicable or not to a
WTO contracting Member, under a GATS annex, corresponding
to the TRIPS precedent.
C. Theory of Balancing Rights: Intellectual Property and
Maritime Transport
TRIPS negotiations have spawned a theory of balance, due
130
to serving as a platform for bargaining and trade-off practice.
This theory will be enlightening for sea transport regimes, because both IP and sea cargo transport regimes face the same
situation of conflicts between interest groups and respective
277, 290 (2009); Arthur Donovan, Intermodal Transportation in Historical
Perspective, 27 TRANSP. LJ. 317, 318 (2000).
123 Donovan, supra note 122.
124
Gelina Harlaftis & Ioannis Theotokas, Maritime Business During the
Twentieth Century: Continuity and Change, in THE HANDBOOK OF MARITIME
ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS 3, 7 (Costas Th. Grammenos ed., 2d ed. 2010).
125
See e.g. Schmeltzer & Peavy, supra note 121, at 223-25; Estrella Faria,
supra note 122, at 292.
126
See generally Hamburg Rules, supra note 8; Rotterdam Rules, supra
note 5.
127
See MICHAEL F. STURLEY, TOMOTAKA FUJITA, & GERTJAN VAN DER ZIEL,
THE ROTTERDAM RULES: THE UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE OF GOODS WHOLLY OR PARTLY BY SEA 125 (2010).
128
Id.
129
Rotterdam Rules, supra note 5, art. 90 (stating that no reservations to
the Convention are permitted).
130
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 7 (stipulating, “The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination
of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and
to a balance of rights and obligations.”); see also Reichman, supra note 41, at
33-36, 60-62, 152, 171, 187, 421.
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131

countries, and both try to harmonize the conflicts through
132
treaties. As to the TRIPS precedent, the WTO balanced the
133
interests between the IP rights holders and consumers, and
as between the developed world and latecomers of developing
134
countries. Likewise, a sea transport regime needs to achieve
135
a balance between exempt rights holders (carriers) and con136
and between the traditional
sumers (the cargo interests),
maritime powers from the developed world and latecomers to
137
international trade (i.e. developing countries). While developed countries were pursuing a high level of protection on their
interests at the worldwide level, with numerous liability exemptions, an opposite trend was taking place in the developing
138
world. In the context of pre-1970s patent and copyright protections, developed countries sought to protect IP rights at high
139
standards. The United States started using the US Tariff
140
Act to combat the infringement of United States patents by
141
foreign enterprises at the domestic level. It also introduced,
together with the EU, a draft agreement on measures discouraging the importation of counterfeit goods into the Tokyo

131

TRIPS balanced between IP rights holds from developed countries and
consumers from developing countries. The sea cargo transport regime deals
with the carriers from traditional shipping powers from Europe, e.g. Great
Britain, Greece, and Norway, and cargo export country outside Europe, such
as China.
132
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 7. The Rotterdam Rules state in
Preamble that “Reaffirming their belief that international trade on the basis
of equality and mutual benefit is an important element . . ., Convinced that
the progressive harmonization and unification of international trade law . . .
significantly contributes to universal economic cooperation among all States
on a basis of equality, equity and common interest, and to the well-being of
all peoples . . . ”.
133
Id.
134
Id. Reichman, supra note 41, at 33-36, 60-62, 152, 171, 187, 421.
135
Faria, supra note 122 (e.g., European shipping powers).
136
Id. Review of Maritime Transport, supra note 30, at 70. There are a
number of newly emerged shipping and cargo export countries, such as China, Singapore, the Republic of Korea and Saudi Arabia.
137
Id.
138
Reichman, supra note 41, at 24-25.
139
Yusuf, supra note 86, at 6.
140
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2004).
141
Yusuf, supra note 86, at 7. See also S. Sell, Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust in Developing World: Crisis, Coercion and Choice, 49
INT’L ORG. 315, 315-49 (1995).
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142

Round of multilateral negotiations. Conversely, developing
countries sought to obtain the allowance of parallel imports, a
greater scope for compulsory licensing, and less restrictive cop143
yright protection in order to benefit local social welfare and
144
knowledge distribution.
In the 1970s, developing countries tried to obtain more
145
flexibility in the IP rights regime. For instance, the developing countries stimulated the revisions of the Paris Convention
146
and the Berne Convention under the WIPO’s administration.
Although there were divergent expectations about levels of
regulation, views began to converge during the WTO and
TRIPS negotiations. The GATT connection to IP was insisted
upon first by the developed countries, not because of a belief
that the strengthening of IP rights protection would further
liberalize international trade, but as a bargaining chip for the
access of developing countries’ products to the markets of de147
veloped countries.
On the other hand, the developing countries themselves
gradually perceived the GATT-based multilateral negotiations
as a lesser evil than bilateral concessions, due to the fact that it
led to trade-offs between the more greatly protected intellectual
goods and market access of other goods from the developing
world, such as agriculture, textiles and tropical products, to the
148
industrial countries.
As a result, a group of fourteen developing countries submitted a detailed proposal on TRIPS, which consisted of their
views on the content and level of the standards on IP protec142

See Agreement on Measures to Discourage the Importation of Counterfeit Goods, GATT Doc. L/4817 (July 31, 1979); Yusuf, supra note 86, at 7
(noting that this proposed agreement on counterfeit goods had not been
adopted by the Tokyo Rounds, but it triggered the discussions in the GATT
through the earlier 1980s and until the Uruguay Round for the adoption of
the TRIPS).
143
Yusuf, supra note 86, at 5 (in the way of permit relatively speedy reprinting and translation of books related to educational and scientific development).
144
Id. at 5.
145
Id. at 4-6. Reichman, supra note 41, at 23.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 9; Agreement on Measures to Discourage the Importation of
Counterfeit Goods, GATT Doc. L/4817 (July 31, 1979).
148
Yusuf, supra note 86, at 9; Reichman, supra note 41, at 25; David Hartridge & Arvind Subramanian, Intellectual Property Rights: The Issues in
GATT, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 893, 895-96 (1989).
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149

tion.
The submission of this proposal heralded the acceptance of a GATT-based standard-setting approach in IP pro150
tection by the developing world. Thus, the WIPO administrates IP negotiations in a way that focuses on the countries’
arguments for or against the higher level of protection of IP
rights. Unlike the UN’s WIPO approach, the trade-off bargaining happened to the TRIPS-based multilateral negotiations
within the overall WTO framework. Therefore, the WTO is capable of engaging both the developed and developing world, allowing them to bargain with each other.
Moreover, interest groups can have access to negotia151
tions and derive profits from harmonization of IP and of sea
152
transport, respectively, within the WTO system. The access
to negotiations is a way for developing countries to take part in
the rule making process, while developed countries can derive
profits from TRIPS. TRIPS successfully imposes levels of protection, through imposing minimum standards on patents, es153
pecially on the criteria of eligibility and duration. These protections have not been addressed under the Paris Convention.
Meanwhile, developing countries can gain bargaining chips
154
in the sector of goods, services and IP. For example, they
149
See Communication from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia,
Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Tanzania, Uruguay and Zimbabwe, Applicability of the Basic Principles of the GATT and of Relevant International Intellectual Property Conventions, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/71 (May 14,
1990); Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003, WT/L/540 and
Corr.1 (Sept. 1, 2003). Yusuf, supra note 86, at 9.
150
See e.g. Yusuf, supra note 86, at 9; Reichman, supra note 41, at 25.
151
Henry Gao, Evaluating Alternative Approaches to GATS Negotiations:
Sectoral, Formulae, and Others, in GATS AND THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES 183 (Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl, &
Pierre Sauvé eds., 2008).
152
See IP, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: TRIPS
AGREEMENT (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 2d ed. 2008). See
Pierre Sauvé, Been There, Not Yet Done That: Lessons and Challenges in Services Trade, in GATS AND THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
SERVICES 599, 603-607 (Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl, & Pierre Sauvé eds.,
2008).
153
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 14, 27(1) and 28(1); Cf. Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5A, Mar. 20, 1883,
as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
See Reichman, supra note 41, at 30-31, 48, 49 (discussing the elevation of
Paris-Convention, Berne-Convention and Rome Convention standards to the
TRIPS standard).
154
BENJAMIN PARAMESWARAN, THE LIBERALIZATION OF MARITIME
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used IP protection as a bargaining chip in exchange for better
negotiating positions in other areas, such as trade in goods un155
der GATT or trade in services under the GATS. In this way,
developed countries maintain certain high standards, but the
developing countries successfully were also spared some limita156
tions, such as compulsory licensing, and parallel importing.
The incorporated Berne Convention (1971) and its appendix of
preferential measures puts limits on the rights holders from
the developed world by enabling nationals of the developing
countries to secure non-exclusive compulsory licenses on favor157
able terms. It is a compromise and the limitation is also
qualified. For example, TRIPS addresses the scope of copyright
158
protection by echoing the Berne Convention (1971), confining
159
the limitation or exceptions.
In light of TRIPS, the WTO provides a bigger negotiating
forum with trade-off practices to foster harmonization on sea
transport. TRIPS allows IP to be connected to other WTO covered areas of trade under the GATT or GATS such as, agricul160
ture, textiles and tropical products. Therefore, the negotiations of a higher standard of IP protection supported by
industrialized countries gave the developing countries bargaining chips in such areas as agriculture, textiles, and tropical
161
products. Similarly, the GATS provides maritime transport
with a range of bargaining opportunities under other areas
covered by the GATS, GATT and TRIPS between different in-

TRANSPORT SERVICES: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE WTO/GATS
FRAMEWORK 252-53 (2004) (describing different bargaining chips available to
developing countries under GATT, TRIPS and other service sectors under the
GATS).
155
GATT, supra note 2; see also WTO Legal Texts, supra note 82.
156
Reichman, supra note 41, at 33-36 (discussing limits of the Patentee’s
exclusive rights with specific analysis on compulsory licenses and public interest exception).
157
See Berne Convention, supra note 85, art. 21 and app. arts. I – VI; see
Reichman, supra note 41, at 44.
158
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 9.2.
159
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 13; see Reichman, supra
note 41, at 63 (analyzing the constraints of licensing which limit the developing countries).
160
Yusuf, supra note 86, at 9; PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154 (describing
the trade-off problem in maritime negotiations).
161
PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154; see also Marrakesh Agreement, supra
note 4; GATT, supra note 2.
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162

terest groups and respective countries.
Similar conflicting groups compete under TRIPS and in
163
maritime transport negotiations. The majority of maritime
164
powers are Western developed countries
who have estab165
lished exempt rights for carriers through earlier treaties. In
contrast, developing countries accommodate a great number of
shippers and cargo interest groups, but they are latecomers to
166
international trade and transport. As latecomers, the developing countries had to abide by previous sea transport conven167
168
tions and were unable to amend the established rules that
169
were unfriendly to them. Facing these conflicts, the WTO
enables the GATS to balance rights and interests between developed and developing worlds, between traditional shipping
powers and new born hull-interest representative countries
from the otherwise developed and developing world, and be170
tween the hull and the cargo interest groups. Therefore, if
the WTO initiates special negotiations on maritime transport,
the TRIPS balancing theory and trade-off practices may apply
to shipping areas and promote its harmonization.
D. Universal Regulation on Minimum Standards: From IP
Protection to the Levels of Carrier’s Liability
The level of regulations, which are seen in the form of min171
imum standards, result from balancing rights through nego172
tiations. The absorption of pre-GATT IP regimes into the
world trading system entails the introduction of universal min162

See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 4; GATT, supra note 2.
Reichman, supra note 41, at 23-78 (Conflicting groups in IP negotiations); see also PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 185-312 (Conflicting
groups in maritime transport negotiations).
164
Faria, supra note 122, at 289.
165
See the Hague Rules, supra note 6; see also the Visby Rules, supra
note 7 (describing the protection on carriers in terms of exempt rights and
limits of litigation on cargo damages).
166
Faria, supra note 122, at 278-92.
167
The Hague Rules, supra note 6; see also the Visby Rules, supra note 7.
168
The Hamburg Rules, supra note 8 (These rules are not widely ratified).
169
Faria, supra note 122, at 278-92.
170
See Panizzon, Pohl & Sauve, supra note 152.
171
Reichman, supra note 41, at 23-78.
172
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 7 & 21.
163

25

2. LIJUN ZHAO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

5/20/15 10:31 PM

TRANSPORTATION, COOPERATION

85

173

imum standards on IP protection into TRIPS. The levels are
explored through balancing the relations between innovators
174
and latecomers in an integrated world market. Based on the
175
and the most-favouredprinciples of national treatment
176
nation provision, WTO Members must accord to the nationals of other Members. These international minimum standards
of IP protection are comprised within the treatment provided
177
for in TRIPS agreement. One component of these TRIPS na173
For a detailed analysis on conditions nurturing the growth of universal legal standards, see generally Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L., 529, 543-50 (1993) (emphasizing the important
role of multilateral forums in the creation and shaping of contemporary international law and the ability of these forums to move the solutions substantially towards acquiring the status of international law); see also, Mohamed
Omar Gad, TRIPS Dispute Settlement and Developing Country Interest, in
INTELLECTUAL PROP. AND INT’L TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, 321, 321-83
(Carlos M. Correa and Abdulqawi A. Yusuf , eds., 2nd ed., 2008).
174
See supra Section on balancing theory; Reichman, supra note 41, at
21; Andres Moncayo von Hase, The Application and Interpretation of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in
INTELLECTUAL PROP. AND INT’L TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT at 83-124 (Carlos M. Correa and Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, eds, 2nd ed., 2008) (stating that the
TRIPs regime is a treaty that establishes a public international law regime
on the protection of private rights through the establishment of minimum
standards and enforcement mechanisms).
175
The WTO national-treatment obligation requires non-discrimination
against foreign rights holders. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 3.1
“National Treatment” (stating,
“1. Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with
regard to the protection3 of intellectual property, subject to the exceptions already provided in, respectively, the Paris Convention (1967), the
Berne Convention (1971), the Rome Convention or the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits. In respect of performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations, this
obligation only apply in respect of the rights provided under this
Agreement. Any Member availing itself of the possibilities provided in
Article 6 of the Berne Convention (1971) or paragraph 1(b) of Article 16
of the Rome Convention shall make a notification as foreseen in those
provisions to the Council for TRIPS”).
176
The WTO Most-Favoured-Nation-Treatment obligation requires the
equal treatment under the domestic laws; see TRIPS Agreement, supra note
15, art. 4 “Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment” (providing “With regard to the
protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members. Exempted from this obligation is any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity accorded by a Member . . . .”).
177
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 1.3 and Part II (entitled Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Intellectual Property
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tional and equal treatments constitutes the selective parts of
the Paris Convention (1967), Berne Conventions (1971) and of
178
the IPIC Treaty. The other component consists of minimum
standards that the TRIPS agreement creates irrespective of
earlier instruments. Either way, the relevant standards are
179
binding on all Members.
180
The developed countries achieved their goals in TRIPS
to elevate and harmonize minimum standards in several areas
181
that had been established previously. With regard to patent
protection, the Paris Convention strengthened the IP protec182
tion (1967). A WTO member has to respect a previous convention referred and abide by the universal minimum standards within the convention, even if it has not ratified the
183
earlier convention. The only possibility for deviation from the
universal standards of patent protection is that a WTO Member is in a transition period, being either a developing country
184
or a least-developed country. The notion of transition gains
wider acceptance for the WTO particularly from the developing
185
nations. Also, TRIPS augments the minimum standards of
protection for other areas of IP, including the trademark and

Rights); Reichman, supra note 41, at 26-30.
178
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 1.3 (providing “general provisions and basic principles”).
179
Id. art. 9.1 (describing standards and “relations to the Berne Convention”); Reichman, supra note 41, at 29, n.39 and 46 (distinguishing TRIPs as
a multilateral trade agreement binding on all members from a plurilateral
trade agreement, which is binding only for members which have accepted
them). Most but not all the minimum standards, set out by the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention are made applicable to all WTO member
countries because of the TRIPS reference, no matter whether the Member is
contacted to those conventions or not).
180
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, art. 16 (explaining well-known
trademarks) and 22-24 (showing geographical Indications).
181
Id. arts. 2.2 and 70.
182
Reichman, supra note 41, at 30, 43 (claiming that intellectual property
protection is strengthened).
183
See WTO Membership, supra note 115. (All WTO Members have to
implement the TRIPS and GATS unless in transitional period); see also
TRIPS Agreement supra note 15, arts. 65-67. (describing requirements of
transitional periods).
184
Reichman, supra note 41, at 31; see TRIPS Agreement supra note 15,
arts. 65 & 66.
185
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 65-67 (providing privileges for
developed countries).
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186

geographical indication of origin. As to copyright protection
under the Berne Convention, TRIPS incorporates most but not
all of the minimum standards set out in this earlier conven187
188
tion, adding certain additional standards of its own and
begins the task of harmonizing the protection of neighboring
189
rights. Nonetheless, TRIPS qualified the scope of areas subject to minimum standards. For instance, TRIPS excludes the
compulsory license provisions of the IPIC Treaty from the list
190
of mandatory international minimum standards.
TRIPS practices regarding minimum standards shed light
on the WTO efforts to establish minimum standards on
transport services under GATS. Both IP and services are invisible outputs, which are qualitatively different from physical
goods.191 In order to ensure information symmetry on the quality of services, it is necessary to establish certain instruments
through government actions.192 Especially in the case of liner
shipping and engagements of small shippers, legal instruments
on the levels of carriers’ minimum liability will protect the consumers from relatively bigger carriers’ abuse of standard con193
tracts and immunity clauses. Within the WTO system, the
maritime transport as a service sector falls within the scope of
the GATS, which is a parallel counterpart of GATT and
194
TRIPS.
186

Reichman, supra note 41, at 41-44.
Id.
188
Correa & Yusuf, supra note 152, at 125-382 (discussing new standards
for IP protection in TRIPS).
189
Reichman, supra note 41, at 45.
190
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 35-38.
191
Michael Fritsch, Thomas Wein & Hans-Jürgen Ewers,
MARKTVERSAGEN UND WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK: MIKROÖKONOMISCHE GRUNDLAGEN
STAATLICHEN HANDELNS [MARKET FAILURE AND ECONOMIC POLICY:
MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF GOVERNMENT ACTION, at 272-94 (4th ed.
2001).
192
Id.
193
Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Claus Ott, Freedom of Contract, Contract
Law and the Fully Specified Contract, in The Economic Analysis of Civil Law,
at 273-295 (Edward Elgar ed., 2004), (arguing freedom of contract is “the basis upon which a properly functioning competitive economy that directs resources to the highest value use is grounded”, but the market failure entails
government action to restrict the abuse of this freedom. The bills of lading
are the standard contracts of carriage of goods by sea that are widely used in
liner shipping).
194
See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 4; see generally Jackson, supra
note 40; Reichman, supra note 41.
187
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195

Moreover, the WTO principles
do not conflict with
TRIPS and the GATS creating minimum standards. The objective of the GATS is to liberalize trade-in services rather than to
deregulate services. 196 The liberalization of markets entails the
removal of the regulations that causes harm in such a free and
197
competitive market. However, a service sector can benefit
198
from certain regulations. GATS Article VI specifically provides qualification requirements and procedures, technical
standards and licensing requirements recognizing “the right of
Members to regulate and to introduce new regulations, on the
supply of services within their territories in order to meet na199
tional policy objectives.” In fact, this Article does not set
standards for a service sector, nor does it provide for the review
of national standards. It instead aims to increase transparency,
which means access to being informed of regulations, standards
200
and procedures for licensing or obtaining qualifications.
However, the GATS has not set any standard for service quali201
ty so far. Additionally, the GATS does not require a WTO
Member to submit any national instruments for review by oth202
er Members. What the GATS requires is that its Member be
able to demonstrate that a given measure is not more traderestrictive than necessary in the event of a dispute with anoth203
er Member. Therefore, the GATS may follow the TRIPS lev204
els of IP protection to establish levels for sea transport ser195

Principles of the Trading System, WTO (2013)
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm. (These fundamental principles of the multilateral trading system of the WTOP are trade
without discrimination, freer trade (gradually, through negotiations), predictability (through binding and transparency), promoting fair competition,
and encouraging development end economic reforms).
196
GATS - Fact and Fiction, supra note 55, at 11 (stating that many services sectors are closely regulated for very good reasons).
197
Principles of the Trading System, supra note 195 (describing free trade
and promoting fair competition).
198
Fritsch, Wein and Ewers, supra note 191.
199
GATS, supra note 17, art. VI; see also GATS — Fact and Fiction, supra
note 55, at 11.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 9-40 (Standards Concerning
the Availability, Scope and Use of Intellectual Property Rights).
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89
205

E. Enforcement and Dispute Settlement Mechanism: the TRIPS,
GATS and DSU
Traditionally, international trade rules are enforced under
206
either decentralized or centralized paradigms. The pre-WTO
207
208
IP regimes (the Berne Convention and Paris Convention )
seemed to take both approaches. They allow disputes to be
brought before both national courts and the International
209
Court of Justice. However, the disputes brought before the
210
International Court of Justice are only theoretically possible.
Thus, the central approach to file cases before the World Court
became a problem in practice. 211 There was no invoked litigation against the deviation from the agreed minimum stand212
ards, because it seemed like an unfriendly act.
The sea
transport regimes merely apply in a decentralized way in
which contracting countries ratify a convention and incorporate
213
it into national legal system.
205

E.g. Rotterdam Rules art. 17 Basis of Liability [of the Carrier], art. 59
Limits of Liability [of the Carrier], and art. 60 Period of Time for Suit. The
GATS may selectively refer to part of the Rotterdam Rules, the Hague, Visby
or Hamburg Rules, to impose minimum liability on the carrier so as to guarantee the minimum level of quality of transport services.
206
Jonathan T. Fried, Two Paradigms for the Rule of International Trade
Law, 20 CAN.U.S. L.J. 39 (1994) (contrasting centralized model of European
Union which relay on supranational enforcement of European Court of Justice with the decentralized model of the North American Free Trade Agreement that depends on the judicial systems of Members); see also Jerome H.
Reichman, supra note 41, at 63.
207
Paris Convention, supra note 84, at art. 28
208
Berne Convention, supra note 85, at art. 33
209
These conventions allow the contracting countries to deal with disputes at national judicial systems, and disputes can also be brought before
the International Court of Justice.
210
See Paris Convention, supra note 84 at article 28; Berne Convention,
supra note 85, at art. 33. The International Court of Justice works as a world
court, but it deals with relations between public rights instead of intellectual
property rights and contract issues of maritime shipment; see also, International Court of Justice, Cases, http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/index.php, last
accessed 19 February 2013.
211
Gail E. Evans, Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue, 18 WORLD
COMPETITION 137, 147-48 (1994); see also Jerome H. Reichman, supra note 41,
at 64.
212
Evans, supra note 211, at 147-48
213
See status of the Hamburg Rules, supra note 8; Rotterdam Rules, supra note 5. Thus, the sea cargo regimes are implemented through the ratifi-
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214

In contrast, the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM)
guarantees WTO agreements to be effectively enforced at a
215
central level. In this way, the TRIPS agreement fills the two
gaps of pre-existing regimes and implements both approach216
es. TRIPS is guarded by the Council of TRIPS and centrally
enforced under the Dispute Settlement Understanding
217
(DSU), which was practically lacking under the UN WIPO
218
forum. The enforcement of the TRIPS component of the WTO
Agreement primarily depends on the Member’s domestic judicial system, which must meet the minimum standards governing the substantive IP rights, such as patents and copy219
rights. Within TRIPS, Part III of the DSU provides detailed
enforcement procedures, backed up by a centralized dispute
settlement apparatus for all Members; thus agreed minimum
standards within Part II of the DSU can be further maintained
220
in the long run. In this sense, the TRIPS provisions on enforcement complement and reinforce the strengthened universal regulatory framework for international IP relations, which
emerged during the Uruguay Round. Likewise, the Council for
Trade in Services and DSM will safeguard a possible sea
transport annex.

cation of conventions, and then they are guarded by national judicial systems.
214
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art.1, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [“hereinafter DSU”].
215
DSU, id, at art. 1.2.
216
See WTO, Overview: The TRIPS Agreement,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited 10 November 2013); see also Jonathan T. Fried, supra note 206, at 39; Jerome H.
Reichman, supra note 41, at 63-64.
217
DSU, supra note 214 at art. 1. On the one hand, the WTO Members
incorporate the GATT, TRIPS, and GATS articles into their domestic laws; on
the other hand, the disputes on the implementation of these WTO agreements can be brought before the WTO dispute settlement bodies in accordance with DSU.
218
Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, supra note 86, at 9.
219
TRIPS Part II provides the substantive rights and minimum standards, and Part III prescribes the enforcement of the Part II. This set of provisions deals with domestic procedures and remedies for the enforcement of intellectual property rights; See Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, supra note
216.
220
Id.
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IV. TRANSPORTATION AND THE WTO/GATS: LESSONS LEARNT
FROM PROGRESSION AND REGRESSION
The harmonization of liberalizing maritime transport services and unifying maritime transport related regulations can
be jointly negotiated under the WTO. To begin with, the WTO
221
has successfully assumed the twin tasks under TRIPS.
Moreover, the liberalization does not prevent the GATS from
harmonizing the seaborne cargo regime of regulations. The
past sea transport negotiations under the GATS mainly targeted harmonizing the levels of liberalization of shipping mar222
kets. The international regulations which are not competi223
tion distorting do not contradict liberalization.
Thus, the
GATS does not forbid harmonizing the different international
regulations. Last but not least, the harmonizing of liberalization and of sea cargo regime/regulation engaged the same nego224
tiating groups of countries (or territories). The tendency of
liberalization in the international maritime transport area is
also to produce a pattern of balancing and harmonizing coun225
tries with different transport interests.
Whilst developed
countries with renowned merchant fleets were pursuing the
226
high level of liberalization worldwide, an opposite trend took
221

See supra Sec. III (D).
See GATS, supra note 17, at Preamble, ¶ 3-4 (providing “Desiring the
early achievement of progressively higher levels of liberalization of trade in
services through successive rounds of multilateral negotiations aimed at
promoting the interests of all participants on a mutually advantageous basis
and at securing an overall balance of rights and obligations, while giving due
respect to national policy objectives; Recognizing the right of Members to
regulate, and to introduce new regulations, on the supply of services within
their territories in order to meet national policy objectives and, given asymmetries existing with respect to the degree of development of services regulations in different countries, the particular need of developing countries to exercise this right.”).
223
Regina Asariotis, UNCITRAL (Draft) Convention on Contracts for the
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea: Mandatory Rules and Freedom of
Contract, in COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN SHIPPING AND SHIPPING RELATED
INDUSTRIES at 350–65 (Antonis Antapassis, Lia Athanassiou, & Erik Rosaeg
eds., 2009).
224
Council for Trade and Services, Maritime Transport Services: Background Note by the Secretariat, S/C/W/315 (Jun. 7, 2010). The maritime countries or territories are divided into three categories: the hull dominated countries, the cargo-interest dominated countries, and the hybrid interests
countries. A great number of countries belong to the third category.
225
Id. at ¶27.
226
Id. at ¶¶21-27.
222
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place in the developing world with a prosperous export trade in
227
goods but an infant shipping industry. Harmonization becomes more complex in comparison with other industries due to
228
a distinct interest group of third-country transport. Hence,
the WTO will be a feasible negotiating forum to further harmonize liberalization and sea-cargo regulations.
Sea transport has gained a prominent role in the WTO negotiating agenda under the GATS, along with IP under TRIPS,
and maritime related service is an area on which WTO negotia229
tions were scheduled under the GATS. Since the Uruguay
Round Negotiations, the international trade-in services have
been included in the WTO negotiations along with IP.230 The
relationship between sea transport and the WTO can be traced
231
back from the Uruguay Round till the current Doha Round.
As Sturley commented, history is already repeating itself and
there are lessons to be learnt from it; thus, many of today’s ar232
guments stem three decades or more.
The lessons to be
learned from past maritime transport negotiations on liberalization are not only enlightening for the WTO, but for as broad
as all the treaties concerning maritime transport (including
233
UN treaties),
because of same negotiating countries and
same respective interest groups these countries represent. In
light of progress and regress, experience in this part sheds light
on the harmonizing of entire maritime transport treaties.

227

Id.
Id. at ¶27 (discussing cargo geology and third-party shipments, viz.
carriers are neither the producing nor recipient country).
229
Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on the Meeting of 4 June 1996, S/NGMTS/13, (Jun. 11, 1996), ¶2.
230
See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 4.
231
E.g. Council for Trade in Services, Decision on Maritime Transport
Services- on 28 June 1996, S/L/24, (Jul.3, 1996), ¶1 (providing the suspension
and resumption of the negotiations on maritime transport services); see infra
Sec. III.
232
Michael F. Sturley, The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules, 22 J.
MAR. L. & COM., 1, 3 (1991).
233
See, e.g., the Hague Rules, supra note 6; see also the Visby Rules, supra note 7; see also the Hamburg Rules, supra note 8; see also the Rotterdam
Rules in supra note 5.
228
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A. Negotiations on Maritime Transport Service in the Uruguay
Round Negotiations (1986-1994): the WTO, GATS and
Maritime Transport Service
Trade in services was one of the novel issues in comparison
234
with trade in goods under the world trading system. The service issues were introduced into the world trading system (now
the WTO) by the United States over the strenuous objections
235
from both the developing and developed world. Services sectors were officially included in the multilateral negotiations of
world trading system for the first time during the Uruguay
236
237
Round negotiations. The negotiations on services were also
238
separately structured from that on goods. This clear division
highlights the importance of services and reduces the trade-offs
risks between goods and services. It is worth noting that the
239
negotiations on trade in services were accommodated in an
independent multilateral discussion forum on the trade of
240
goods.
The maritime transport negotiations need to address the
trade-off problems amongst services sectors. In the Uruguay
234
GATT, Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, GATT/1396,
(25 September 1986) (clearly distinguishing the trade in goods and trade in
services in its Part I and Part II). The intellectual property rights (TRIPS)
and trade-related investment measures (TRIMS) are also new issues besides
the trade of goods under GATT.
235
Raymond J. Krommenacker, Multilateral Services Negotiations, in THE
NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, 455-73, at 456, (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Meinhard Hilf eds., 1988).
236
GATT, supra note 234.
237
Id. Part II of the Ministerial Declaration on Uruguay Round of September 1986 as to negotiations on trade in services says, “Ministers also
agree, as part of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, to launch negotiations on
trade in services. Negotiations in this area shall aim to establish a multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade in services, including elaboration of possible disciplines for individual sectors, with a view to expansion
of such trade under conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization
and as a means of promoting economic growth of all trading partners and the
development of developing counts. […] GATT procedures and practice shall
apply to these negotiations.
238
Id.
239
Id. at 100 (stating in Part II that “[m]inisters, also decided, as part of
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, to launch negotiations on trade in services”).
240
Id. at 101 (stating that “[A] Group on Negotiations on Services is established to deal with these matters”).
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Round, the shipping industry strongly resisted the world trading system covering transport services. 241 For instance, US
shipping interests asserted that the inclusion of maritime
transport services into the world trading system would be more
harm than benefit. 242 In contrast, a majority of countries supported a broad coverage in the negotiations of services, includ243
ing maritime transport services.
Additionally, the exclusion
of maritime transport would cause domino effects through excessive claims from an increasing number of sectors requesting
244
exclusion from the coverage. The debate came to an end with
the invention of a dual approach to maritime transport negotiations.245
The first progress in maritime transport negotiations is the
introduction of the dual-approach. The dual approach was introduced by a “Group for Negotiations on Services” (GNS)
246
meeting in 1990. Under this approach, sea transport negotiations were held at dual levels: being discussed in a general negotiation forum with all other service sectors at the one level,
and a specific sectoral/sectional maritime transport negotiation
247
forum at the other level.
This approach had earned support
241

Uruguay Round - Group of Negotiations on Services, Report to the
Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting at Ministerial Level, Montreal, December 1988, MTN.GNS/21, (Nov.25, 1988), (announcing the substantial negotiations were begun in December 1988).
242
PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 252-53 (describing US domestic
shipping industry’s resistance). Cf. OECD, Doc. No. DSTI/SI/MTC(94)9
(Mar.8, 1994), at 2-3 (claiming the gains might offset the lost).
243
See Uruguay Round Negotiations- Trade Negotiations Committee,
Mid-term Meeting, MTN.TNC/11, Part II, (Apr.21, 1989) (stating a majority
of member parities supported a universal approach which kept any particular
services sector from being excluded from GATS coverage).
244
See OECD, supra note 242, at 2-3.
245
On Sep.25,1990, Chairman Waldemar Hoffmann of the Working
Group on Maritime Transport Services reported to a GNS meeting, which
generally concluded that a special sectoral/sectional maritime transport annex addressing this very special service sector was necessary, even though
there had no consensus as to the exact contents of such an annex; see more in
The Uruguay Round, Working Group on Maritime Transport Services,
MTN.GNS/TRANS/6 (Nov. 30, 1990), at 1-2; WTO, Uruguay Round Doc. No.
CC-TRAN2, Working Group on Maritime Transport Services-Reports of the
Chairman, (Oct.19, 1990), at 1 (stating that there were different opinions on
the very contents or formats of an annex on maritime transport regime).
246
Id.
247
GATT Secretariat, Multilateral Trade Negotiations the Uruguay
Round - Group of Negotiations on Goods (GATT) Negotiating Group on Dis-
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248

from many participating nations.
These countries agreed to
follow the dual approach to accommodate the need of a particular annex on maritime transport regime, where a specific sector
249
would be regulated under the world trading system. As a result of the dual approach, the maritime transport became one
250
of exclusively negotiated sectors and an avid trade-off nego251
Sea transport was negotiated under the
tiating problem.
transport-specific sectoral/sectional negotiations with air, road
and inland waterways.252 The other specific sectors were finan253
254
cial services and telecommunications, which were also related to sea-borne cargo trade. Therefore, this dual approach
has beneficiary effects of expanding the participation of maritime negotiations and shrinking the trade-off problem.
Another progress is the supplementary mechanisms to
solve disagreements. On the one hand, the bilateral negotiation
was introduced to supplement the on-going of multilateral negotiations. Although the GNS tried to promote consensuses on
255
a multilateral basis, the European Community and the Unit256
ed States had dramatic bilateral conflicts. As a result, the
majority of the initial commitments submitted to the conference contained little or far from sufficient consideration of the
257
interests of the maritime transport sector. Consequently, the
pute Settlement, Meeting of 20 July 1989: MTN.GNG/NG13/15, (Jul.26, 1989).
248
Uruguay Round MTN.GNS/TRANS/6, supra note 245.
249
Id.
250
Uruguay Round Negotiation, Trade in Transport Services- Note by the
Secretariat, MTN.GNS/W/60, (Jul.4, 1989), (addressing air, maritime, multimodal and other transport services).
251
See PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 254-56.
252
Id.
253
Uruguay Round Negotiation, Communication from the Chairman of
the Group of Negotiations on Services to the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee, MTN.GNS/W/117, (Jun.26, 1991), at 5 (addressing the need
of annexes on telecommunications and financial services).
254
Id.
255
Uruguay Round Negotiations, Report to the Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting at Ministerial Level, Montreal, December 1988, MTN.GNS/21,
(Nov.25, 1988).
256
For instance, the disagreement involved in the subsidiary system under the auspices of the European Community Common Agricultural Policy
related services.
257
See e.g. Uruguay Round Negotiations, Conditional Offer of the United
States of America Concerning Initial Commitments, MTN.TNC/W/112,
(Nov.13, 1990); Conditional Offer of Japan Concerning Initial Commitments,
MTN.GNS/W/113, (Nov.29, 1990); Conditional Offer of Australia Concerning
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multilateral negotiations broke down because of conflicts be258
tween the two gigantic economic entities. The multilateral
negotiations on services were not officially resumed until the
United States and the European Community had agreed to en259
ter into bilateral negotiations. On the other hand, a procedural mechanism was designed to assist substantial negotiations. For example, the GNS adopted “Procedural Guidelines”
for substantial negotiations to solve the substantial disagree260
ments. Consequently, the results of the negotiations successfully covered twelve service sectors and their subsectors, including transport service and its subsector maritime
261
transport. It seems that a future agreement on maritime
transport must be rooted in a consensus between the US and
European countries.
The additional advance made by the Uruguay Round negotiations to maritime transport was the creation of a model
262
scheduled approach. These modes were drawn up by the European Community in an “Ideal Quad Schedule on Internation263
al Shipping” which was endorsed by three trade giants, the
Initial Commitments, MTN.TNC/W/51, (Dec.4, 1990); Conditional Offer of
Hong Kong Concerning Initial Commitments, MTN.TNC/W/54, (4 December
1990). Cf. GATT Secretariat, Draft Final Act Embodying the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations MTN.TNC/W/35 (Nov.26, 1990);
PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 328, 364-65 (addressing the issues on
GATS Annex on Maritime Transport Services).
258
PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 211-12, 266-68 (describing developments of the multilateral negotiations as to service from mid-term review
in Montreal in Dec. 1988 to the Ministerial-level Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting in Brussels in 1990).
259
WTO, Press Release GW/11, at 10.
260
Uruguay Round Negotiations, Communication from the Chairman of
the Group of Negotiations on Services to the Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Committee, MTN.GNS/W/117, (Jun.24,1991), (addressing the need of
annexes on telecommunications and financial services), at 3, ¶ 4 (mentioning
substantive and procedural guidelines); Uruguay Round Negotiations, Procedural Guidelines for Negotiations on Initial Commitments, MTN.GNS/W/119,
(Jul.2, 1991), ¶ 3.
261
See Uruguay Round Negotiations, Communication from the Chairman
of the Group of Negotiations on Services to the Chairman of the Trade of Negotiations Committee, MTN.GNS/W/117, (addressing the need of annexes on
telecommunications and financial services), at 3.
262
See GATS, supra note 17, at art. I.2 (prescribing that the four modes
of maritime transport services according to the supply of a services).
263
WTO, Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note of the
Meeting of 5 May 1994, TS/NGMTS/1, (Jun.10, 1994), at 2 (mentioning EC’s
draft schedule of late 1992). EC, Quad Ideal Draft Schedule on International
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264

United States, Canada and Japan. According to the forms of
supply, maritime transport services were divided into four
265
modes:
Mode 1 cross-border supply (e.g. international
266
Mode 2 consumption
freights and passengers shipping);
267
abroad, (e.g. vessel repair);
Mode 3 overseas commercial
268
presence; and Mode 4 the supply of transport related services
through the presence of natural persons.269 The classification of
modes makes the participants’ offers clearly comparable and
saves negotiating time when there are disagreements on the
levels of harmonization.
Although the inclusion of maritime transport into the
world trading system was agreed upon after the introduction of
the dual-level approach, one area where there is a lack of progress is the Uruguay Round. The draft “Annex on Maritime
Transport Services” did not pass in order to become binding on
270
Members. The difficulty in the passing of this maritime Annex was the bilateral disagreement between the United States
and the European Community within the multilateral negotiations. 271 For instance, they disagreed on the scope which service sectors covered and whether special agreements should be
presented in the form of annexes to a general agreement on
services. 272
Maritime transport services were covered by a draft annex,
273
which included air, road and inland waterway transport.
Shipping, Inside US Trade, Jul.20, 1993, Special Report, at 2-4.
264
Id.
265
See GATS, supra note 17 at art. I.2
266
See id., at art. I.2(a). (a) states “from the territory of one Member into
the territory of any other Member.” This paper aims to unify the freight
transport laws regarding Mode 1 in the context of overall harmonization of
shipping regimes.
267
GATS, supra note 17 at art. I.2(b). It states: “in the territory of one
Member to the service consumer of any other Member”.
268
GATS supra note 17 at art. I.2 (c) : “by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member”.
269
GATS, supra note 17 at art. I.2 (d) provides: “by a service supplier of
one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member”, e.g. Maritime cargo handling, storage and warehouse in ports, customs clearances, container station and depot; see also
Parameswaran, supra notes 154, 306 footnotes 1437-40.
270
Uruguay Round Negotiations, supra note 245.
271
PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 214.
272
Id.
273
Uruguay Round Negotiations-Trade Negotiations Committee, Draft
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However, maritime transport became the unique sector that
was drafted in an annex but not adopted, due to the lack of the
general admitted levels of harmonization in Members’ commitments. 274 Nevertheless, the United States and the European Community had not given up maritime transport negotiations and agreed to settle their disputes by launching bilateral
negotiations on controversial service sectors after the conclu275
sion of the Uruguay Round. In terms of the coverage of incorporated transport service, the European Community drafted
a maritime sectoral/sectional annex applying to all international maritime cargo transport services, including bulk cargo
276
shipping and liner shipping. Their plan was too comprehensive to gain general support at the beginning stages of negotia277
and the broad spectrum would possibly encounter
tions,
278
more difficulties.
Therefore, the task of harmonization
279
should be started from a small area, such as liner shipping.
The Final Act Embodying the Results of Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations was officially signed, and the
GATS became an indispensable component of the WTO, in
280
Marrakesh on April 15, 1994. The GATS disciplines general281
ly apply to all service sectors with various degrees of unificaFinal Act Embodying the Result of Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations – Revision, MTN.TNC/W/35/Rev.1, (Dec.3, 1990), (drafting the annexes on maritime inland waterway, road, air transport, financial services,
telecommunications, and audio-visual services).
274
WTO, GATS and its annex, supra note 15. As to financial services, a
protocol (Second Protocol to the GATS) was adopted on 21 July 1995, and entered into force on 1 September 1996. Subsequently another protocol (Fifth
Protocol to the GATS) as to financial services was adopted on 14 November
1997, and entered into force on 1 March 1999. Others protocols concerning
the movement of nature persons (Third Protocol to the GATS) and as to telecommunications (Fourth Protocol to the GATS) have also been adopted and
entered into force.
275
PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 214.
276
See Uruguay Round Negotiations-Group of Negotiations on Services,
Draft: General Agreement on Trade in Services, MTN.GNS/W/105, (Jun.18,
1990), (a proposal from the European Community).
277
Uruguay Round Negotiations, supra notes 260 and 261.
278
Id.
279
The consumers of liner shipping are not economic equals with the
transport service provider, in order to protect them from abusing of liner carriers, it is necessary to establish international regulations. In bulk shipping
sector, the problem is not as severe as liner shipping.
280
See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 4.
281
GATS supra note 17 at Preamble ¶ 3; GATS Article XIX (conveying
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282

tion from sector to sector.
The inclusion of maritime
transport services into the GATS is officially confirmed in the
form of a GATS Annex entitled “Negotiations on Maritime
283
Transport Services”. Therefore, further negotiations of harmonization may be situated under the Annex.
B. Progress in the NGMTS Negotiations (1994-1997): Bilateral
or Multilateral?
The maritime transport negotiations occurred in the era of
specific sectoral/sectional negotiations after the Uruguay
284
According to Ministerial Decision on
Round Negotiations.
285
Negotiations on Maritime Transport Services
and GATS
286
the WTO
“Annex on Negotiation on Maritime Transport,”
provided the mandate for specific sectoral/sectional negotiations on maritime transport to be commenced no later thanMay
287
16, 1994 and closed by June 1996.
The first advancement was that the design of dual-level
negotiations which was maintained as a specific secotral discussion forum under the “Negotiating Group on Maritime
288
Transport Services” (NGMTS). This group was established
289
for the exclusive handling of the maritime transport regime.
Thus, the sectoral/sectional negotiations reduced the trade-off
that successive rounds of multilateral negotiations in the GATT tradition as
foreseen in the GATS will broaden and deepen in maritime transport services).
282
The application to a specific service sector was highly influenced by
the related negotiations and the concrete commitments. For example, the area of maritime transport services was suspended after the Uruguay Negotiations until 1994. See WTO, Services: Post-Negotiations - Post-Uruguay Round
Negotiation (1994-97),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/s_negs_posturuguay_e.htm, accessed 3 July 2012.
283
See GATS, supra note 17, at annexes.
284
See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 4.
285
Id.
286
See GATS, supra note 17 at annexes.
287
Id. at ¶ 4 states: “The NGMTS shall hold its first negotiating session
no later than 16 May 1994. It shall conclude these negotiations and make a
final report no later than June 1996. The final report of the NGMTS shall include a date for the implementation of results of these negotiations”.
288
Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Negotiations on
Maritime Transport Services-Note by the Secretariat, TS/NGMTS/W/1, (2 May
1994), at 1.
289
Id.
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risks between service sectors and reduced the opposition from
the shipping industry.
During the post-Uruguay Round Negotiations, the second
advancement was that the NGMTS had integrated the UN
290
agencies and elaborately worked together in depth for the
291
first time. By the end of 1996, there were fifty-six mem292
293
bers, as well as sixteen observers, in the NGMTS negotiations. These participants substantially engaged in the NGMTS
294
negotiations through sixteen formal meetings at Marrakesh.
However, only international organizations obtained the right of
observership. Some of the international organizations included
were the OECD, UNCTAD and World Bank. 295
The third advancement is the method by which the
NGMTS exclusively based substantial negotiations on primary
data. The NGMTS had its Secretariat prepare a questionnaire
296
to collect primary information in 1994. The finalized ques290

See infra notes 291 and 292 for inter-government organizations, such
as UNCTAD and the World Bank.
291
See Note by the Secretariat, supra note 288; see also PARAMESWARAN,
supra note 154, at 287-91.
292
See Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note of the
Meeting of 13 July 1994, S/NGMTS/2, (4 Aug., 1994), ¶ 1-3 (claiming that
there had been forty seven participating members if counting the European
Community countries separately by August 1994); Note of the Meeting of 9-10
February, S/NGMTS/4, (9 Mar., 1995), at 1; Note of the Meeting of 17-19 July,
S/NGMTS/6, (3 Aug., 1995), at 1; Note of the Meeting of 30 October-1 November 1995, S/NGMTS/7, (Nov.16, 1995), at 1.
293
Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Report of the Negotiating Group on Maritime Services, S/NGMTS/16 (3 July 1996), ¶3; WTO
Doc. No. S/NGMTS/2 (4 Aug., 1994) (notifying that two intergovernmental
organization -the UNCTAD and the OECD – become observers); Note of the
Meeting of 17 October, S/NGMTS/3, (31 Oct., 1994), at 1 (announcing that the
World Bank also became another observer, but the American Institute of
Merchant Shipping did not). Cf. WTO Doc. No. S/NGMTS/2, (4 Aug., 1994), at
1 (stating that the Council and European and Japanese Shipowners’ Associations applied to attend the meeting as an observer); Note on the Meeting of 910 February 1995, S/NGMTS/4, (Mar. 9, 1995), at 1 (declining to grant observer status to two private-sector organizations-the Council of European and
Japanese National Shipowners Associations and the American Institute of
Merchant Shipping- on the basis of an expressed preference on the part of
several delegations for limiting observership to inter-governmental organizations).
294
See Note by the Secretariat, supra note 288 at 1; see also
PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 287-91.
295
Id.
296
Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Questionnaire on
Maritime Transport Services S/NGMTS/W/2, (Oct.21, 1994), at 2-10 (publish-
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tionnaire was very comprehensive, consisting of two parts. 297
The questionnaire covered matters beyond liberalization and
regulation issues, such as the economic structure, including
trade flows and regulatory structures applying to liner and
298
tramp shipping. Part I of the questionnaire covered economic
299
structure and statistics on international shipping markets.
Part II of the questionnaire dealt with the regulatory struc300
tures applicable for maritime transport in each Member. A
wide range of participants committed themselves to respond301
ing. Almost all NGMTS members and observers responded to
ing the schemes of the questionnaire and stating that the questionnaire
serves the purpose of establishing factual background but not extends to issues such as competition law and shipping conferences, as well on the institutional arrangements).
297
Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on the Meeting of 4 August 1994, S/NGMTS/2 (Oct. 21, 1994) at ¶ 6; WTO, Questionnaire
on Maritime Transport Services, S/NGMTS/W/2 (Oct.21, 1994), at 3-10.
298
Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on the Meeting of 13 July 1994, S/NGMTS/2 (Aug.4, 1994) ¶11 (mentioning that the
questionnaire would be produced by the Secretariat on the economic structure, including trade flows and on regulatory structures); S/NGMTS/W/2,
(Oct.21, 1994), at 1 (stating that the questionnaire has been prepared for circulation to all participants and observers of the NGMTS on Jul.13, 1994).
299
See Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services, supra note 296 at 2
(stating in Introductory Comments, that the questions were designed to capture, as fully as possible, the information on participants’ market and regulatory structures applying to the maritime transport services sector, including
both cargo and passenger transportation where relevant); WTO, Note of the
Meeting of 17 October 1994, S/NGMTS/3, (Oct. 31, 1994), at 2, ¶ 6 (restating
the purpose of the questionnaire is to establish factual background and did
not imply a broadening of the scope of the negotiations).
300
Id.
301
See WTO – Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note
on the Meeting of 13 July 1994, S/NGMTS/2, (Aug.4, 1994). WTO, Questionnaire and Response to the Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services,
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.-- (1994-1995) (covering 34 countries). WTO, Communication from Australia-Response to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services, S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.4, (Feb.24, 1995), ¶ 8; WTO-NGMTS, Communication from the United States of America-Response to Questionnaire on
Maritime Transport Services, S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.11, (Jan. 31, 1995), ¶¶ 3-4;
WTO, Communication from the European Community and Their Member
States-Response to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services,
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.12, (Feb. 17, 1995), at 37, 43; WTO, Communication from
Hong Kong-Response to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services,
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.15f, (Feb. 10, 1995), at 4; WTO, NGMTS, Communication
from Malaysia-Response to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services,
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.19, (Mar. 13, 1995), ¶ 4; WTO, Communication from
Ghana-Response to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services,
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.21, (Apr. 3, 1995), ¶ 3; WTO, Communication from Ar-
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302

it, so that the information collected became comprehensive
and worked as the factual background for the further negotia303
tions.
Additionally, progress has been achieved in two other areas as well. First, a majority of participants recognized the need
to increase transparency on various domestic shipping regula304
tions and the value of legal certainty. Furthermore, the importance of multimodal transport turned out to be further high305
lighted at the WTO.
For example, the United States
delegation stressed the inclusion of the door-to-door supply of
transport services within GATS framework in its informal
306
statement on multimodal transport.
However, it is necessary to address the area of multimodal
transport after the achievement in sea transport. As to inland
transport by truck, members impose various domestic instruments, which make the harmonization of multimodal transport
307
very difficult.
Subsequently, the joint negotiations on all
transport modes would make the sea transport negotiations
more difficult. Owing to the absence of joint negotiations on air,
gentina-Response to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services,
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.22, (Apr. 4, 1995), ¶ 2; WTO, Communication from Turkey-Response to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services,
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.23, (Apr. 6, 1995), ¶ 5; WTO, Communication from Philippines - Response to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services,
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.24, (Apr. 5, 1995), ¶ 6.
302
See generally WTO, infra note 394.
303
Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note of the Meeting of 17-19 July 1995, Doc. No. S/NGMTS/6, (Aug. 3, 1995), ¶ 1 (encouraging
every participant and observer alike to submit their replay in order for the
Group to engage in a new phase of negotiations from as large an information
base as possible). See also Council for Trade in Services, Maritime Transport
Services, Doc. No. S/C/W/62 (Nov. 16, 1998), ¶¶ 1-2.
304
These issues were initiated by a circulated EC Model Schedule, which
was informally circulated among delegations shortly before the conclusion of
the Uruguay Round among the participants. See WTO, Note on the Meeting of
6-7 April 1995, S/NGMTS/5, (Apr. 24, 1995), at 7; See also Negotiating Group
on Maritime Transport Services, Note of the Meeting of 17-19 July 1995 Doc.
No. S/NGMTS/6, (Aug. 3, 1995), ¶ 4; Negotiating Group on Maritime
Transport Services, Note on the Meeting of 13 and 16 February 1996,
S/NGMTS/9, (Mar. 8, 1996), ¶ 5.
305
Cf. the Rotterdam Rules supra note 5 (reflecting the emphasis of multimodal transport under the UN system).
306
OECD, World Trade Organization - Recent Developments in NGMTS,
DSTI/SI/MTC(96)8, (Mar. 7, 1996), at 3-4; see also Parameswaran, supra note
154, at 343-46.
307
See generally WTO, infra note 394.
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sea and inland transport in the Uruguay Round and
308
NGMTS, international multimodal transport arrangements
should not be negotiated before addressing harmonization of
309
sea and inland legs, as well as certain degrees of cabotage on
inland waterways, respectively.
Even so, negotiations encountered a tug of war, which saliently happened between the United States and other partici310
pants. Also, a majority of participants had not rendered sub311
stantive offers for maritime transport. In particular, the US
312
delegation failed to submit a timely and substantial offer. As
a result, most other participants swiftly shifted backwards to
313
their Uruguay-Round propositions. A number of negotiating
representatives claimed that there was a need for a substantial
314
offer from the world’s major trading entities first. Subsequently, their feedback was far from the United States’ expectation on substantial rules on maritime transport under the
315
GATS. It seemed as though many participants were waiting
for the United States’ to submit their substantial offer first, but
the U.S. was waiting for everyone else. Therefore, this historical period demonstrated the difficulty of addressing the tug of
war in the multilateral negotiations.
So far, accomplishing a multilateral agreement on mari316
time transport under GATS is still far from being attained.
The lack of a substantial US offer on maritime transport ser308

Uruguay Round Negotiations, supra note 260 and note 261 (addressing air, maritime, multimodal and other transport services).
309
See generally WTO, infra note 394 (referencing that cabotage is subject to national instruments instead of international instruments).
310
Council for Trade in Services, Decision on Maritime Transport Services: Adopted by Council for Trade in Services on 28 June 1996, S/L/24, (Jul.
3, 1996) ¶¶ 23-30 (enclosing a list of documents of NGMTS negotiations on
maritime transport); see PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 214.
311
Id.
312
OECD, Developments in Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport
Services, DSTI/SI/MTC(95)34, (Oct.4, 1995), at 3-4 (stating that the US violated paragraph 7 of the 1994 Ministerial Decision on Maritime Transport
Service in the form of domestic legislation to improve its negotiating position.
The issue was argued at every the NGMTS meeting during Jul. 1995 to May
1996.
313
Council for Trade in Services, supra note 310, at ¶ 23.
314
Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on the Meeting of 13 and 16 February 1996, S/NGMTS/9, (Mar. 8, 1996), at 2.
315
Council for Trade in Services, supra note 310, at ¶ 23.
316
Id.
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vices has tremendous negative effects in other countries, particularly in developing countries, on the inclusion of this sector
317
into the world trading system. On the one hand, the European Community proposed to promote a mere standstill agreement, taking the view that “the challenge in maritime
[transport service] was not so much to liberalize as to bind the
318
existing openness of most trade regimes.” In contrast, the
United States ardently appealed for an agreement, which in
319
fact liberalized the shipping sector.
The United States
320
claimed that an agreement standstill was not sufficient, and
emphasized that a sea-transport agreement should be promoting the level of liberalization rather than merely reflecting the
321
current level. This was in spite of a last-minute unification
322
effort by twenty-four participants that proposed a package of
draft offers “conditional on a matching, comprehensive offer
323
from the United States” in June 1996. The package constituted several substantial improvements on all three pillars of
maritime transport services, as well as on multimodal
324
transport.
Nevertheless, the United States ultimately
deemed it as merely reinforcing the status quo and repackaging
325
the previous offers that were far from being sufficient. When
317

See also, PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 343-46.
Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on Meeting
of 8 May 1996, S/NGMTS/11 (May 14, 1996), at 2; see also Negotiating Group
on Maritime Transport Services, Note on Meeting of 13 & 16 February 1996,
S/NGMTS/9 (Mar. 8, 1996), ¶ 6.
319
See also Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on
Meeting of 13 & 16 February 1996, S/NGMTS/9 (Mar. 8, 1996), ¶ 5.
320
Id.
321
Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on Meeting
of 16 &19 March 1996, S/NGMTS/10 (Apr.11, 1996), ¶ 3.
322
The European Community members count as one entity.
323
Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on the Meeting of 4 June 1996, S/NGMTS/13 (Jun. 11, 1996), ¶ 2. The participants included Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, the European Community, the Dominican Republic, Hong Kong, Iceland, Japan, Mexico,
Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, South Africa and Switzerland. WTO, Doc.
(unregistered): Conditional Aggregate Package of Offers on Maritime
Transport Services, (Jun. 1996), at 1.
324
Id.
325
Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on the Meeting of 13 and 16 February, S/NGMTS/9 (Mar. 8, 1996), at 1, ¶ 5 (stating that
the US would not put forward either an offer or a request because it did not
consider the existing offers satisfactory); See also WTO, Note on the Meeting
318
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the NGMTS was ended mandatorily, the improved offer submitted by twenty-four countries was rejected because of the
US’s resistance. 326 Consequently, it was widely recognized that
the NGMTS negotiations should not be continued at that mo327
ment, and the NGMTS negotiations between 1994 and 1996
328
fell into a stalemate at the end of June 1996. In order to address the tug of war in future negotiations, bilateral negotiations and multilateral negotiations might be undertaken.
History usually repeats itself. When the Uruguay Round
was nearing its end, some participating members tried to make
a last-minute effort to achieve maritime transport liberaliza329
tion by offering varying degrees of liberalized offers, but these
of 17 June 1996, Doc. No. S/NGMTS/14 (Jun. 24, 1996), at 1; Negotiating
Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on the Meeting of 25 June 1996,
S/NGMTS/15, (Jun. 27, 1996), at 1; Negotiating Group on Maritime
Transport Services, Note on the Meeting of 26 and 29 March 1996,
S/NGMTS/10 (Apr. 11, 1996), at 1 (The United States stressed that the existing offers merely reflected the current situation rather than promoting the
commitments).
326
Id.
327
Id.
328
See WTO, Post-Uruguay Round Negotiations (1994-97)
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/s_negs_posturuguay_e.htm, (last
visited Jul. 27, 2012).
329
Participating members offered different degrees of liberalization on
maritime transport, and a comprehensive substantive commitment on all pillars of maritime transport and on multimodal transport were scarce. e.g.
Uruguay Round, Australia-Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/6,
(Apr. 15, 1994) (excluding the port service from the its negotiating schedule);
Japan, Uruguay Round Doc. No. GATS/SC/46, (Apr. 15, 1994) (excluding the
international shipping sector). Some countries offered rather protectionist
commitments, e.g. Uruguay Round, Egypt-Schedule of Specific Commitments,
GATS/SC/30, (Apr. 15, 1994); Uruguay Round Doc. No. GATS/EL/13 (Apr. 14,
1994); Ghana, Uruguay Round Doc. No. GATS/SC/11 (Apr. 15, 1994), Uruguay Round Doc. No. GATS/SC/35 (Apr. 15, 1994) (stating protectionist commitments on international shipping); WTO, Communication from the European Community and their Member States: Conditional Officer on Maritime
Transport Services, S/NGMTS/W/3, (Jun. 30, 1995), at 1, ¶¶ 2-3 (setting no
limitation on the mode 1, e.g. international shipping, and freight forwarding
services); See also WTO, Communication from Norway- Maritime Transport
Services, S/L/33, (Sep. 12, 1996); WTO, Communication from Malaysia- Maritime Transport Services, S/L/32 (Sep. 12, 1996); Brazil, Uruguay Round Doc
No. GATS/EL/13 (Apr. 15, 1994). Cf. WTO, Communication from IcelandConditional Offer on Maritime Transport Services, S/NGMTS/W/27, (Jun.24,
1996) (mentioning Iceland’s highly liberalized offer covering all three maritime pillars and multimodal transport); Korea-Schedule of Specific Commitments (Apr. 15, 1994) and General Agreement on Trade in Services, Thailand-Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/85, (Apr. 15, 1994).
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meaningful offers were withdrawn before the mandatory close
330
of negotiations, due to the absence of a US offer. Other significant maritime powers either entirely withdrew (e.g. the Eu331
ropean countries) or significantly diminished substantive of332
333
334
fers (e.g. Canada, Japan and India ). Again, the absence
of a US substantial offer led the NGMTS negotiations between
1994 and 1996 to a deadlock. Although the US delegation
claimed that the US regime for maritime transport services
was almost the most liberal in the world, many NGMTS participants felt that there were some ulterior motives associated
with the US reluctance to make a substantive concession on its
domestic restrictive measures, for instance US unilateral cargo
reservation for its domestic carriers and a conservative policy
for its cabotage trade.335 As Parameswaran noted, the NGMTS
seemed to encounter a tug-of-war between the United States
and other participating negotiators:336 the United States was
waiting for other negotiators to submit a set of comprehensive
and adequate offers; nonetheless a considerable number of participating countries would not actively and voluntarily do so
unless the US handed in a substantial offer as a premise.337
At first glance at the failures in negotiations, the history of
NGMTS negotiations has established that it is difficult to
330

See, e.g., Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Communication from the European Community and their Member States,
S/NGMTS/W/5 (Jul. 17, 1995), ¶ 3 (protesting the US unilateral measures affecting the multilateral negotiations on the liberalization of maritime
transport); Parameswaran, supra note 154, at 300.
331
See Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, supra note
330, ¶ 3.
332
Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Communications
from Canada: Conditional Offer on Maritime Transport, S/NGMTS/W/8, (Jul.
18, 1995).
333
WTO, Communications from Japan: Conditional Offer on Maritime
Transport, S/NGMTS/W/5, (Jul.18, 1995).
334
Id.; e.g., Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Communication from India: Conditional Offer on Maritime Transport Services,
S/NGMTS/W/29 (Jul.8, 1996).
335
PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 297-99 (illustrating the insufficiency of the maritime transport offers by shedding lights on developing
countries of Asia and South America, such as India and Brazil).
336
Id. Traditional European maritime powers concerned that inclusion of
maritime transport into GATS framework would downgrade the degree of
liberty of shipping industry.
337
Id. at 299.
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achieve a worldwide enforceable maritime transport regime
without a meaningful participation from the United States.
The previous negotiation practices teach us that a successful
conclusion of an extended negotiation of Uruguay Round negotiation on the GATS is not achievable without the participation
of the US. As further maritime transport negotiations developed, it became obvious that a substantial involvement of the
United States was the precondition for the breakdown of the
paralyzed maritime negotiations.
Further scrutiny of the United States’ practice shows a bilateral approach may break the deadlock in multilateral negotiations. First of all, the absence of a US substantial offer is because there are two conflicting voices as to shipping within this
country. It is the United States government who pioneered the
inclusion of services sectors into WTO;338 meanwhile its domestic shipping industry tried to exclude shipping from being included. 339 The shipping industry’s resistance originated from
the shipowners who feared that their interests granted by national instruments would vanish after maritime transport services were integrated at the world trading system. 340 Moreover,
conflicts within influential parties had not been properly addressed before the multilateral negotiations at the WTO level.
For instance, the confrontation between the United States and
the Europe was once very tough.341 The success of the US-EC
bilateral agreement proves that the tough issues can be addressed by moving from a bilateral approach to extended multi338
US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Trade in Services: Exports and Foreign Revenue - Special Report, OTA-ITE-316 (1986), at 7 (citing
document prepared at the request of the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs as a “separate publication of OTA’s estimates of the impacts of
services trade on the Nation’s balance of payments.”. By 1982, US policymakers had decided “to place a high priority on services in the next round [of multilateral trade negotiations]. Later on, the US augmented international preparations of the multilateral negotiations in service for the Uruguay Round).
339
William DiBenedetto, Hills Asks Congress to Table GATT Maritime
Resolutions, 4 J.L COM., 3B (1989); see also PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154,
at 254.
340
Id.
341
See the US and EC’s disagreement on agriculture caused temporary
suspension of GATS negotiations in PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 21112; 266-68 (describing developments of the multilateral negotiations as to
service from mid-term review in Montreal in December 1988 to the Ministerial-level Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting in Brussels in 1990 because
of a compromise between the EC and the US); Uruguay Round Negotiations,
MTN.GNS/W/60, supra note 250 at ¶49-94 on maritime transport.
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lateral negotiations. 342 Further, in recent maritime negotiations, bilateral agreements are highly helpful between important trade regions, such as those concluded between the European Union and China, 343 and the United States and
China.344 Therefore, bilateral negotiations will help the multilateral trading negotiations remove difficulties.
C. Regression in Doha Round Negotiations (2000): Trade-off
Problem and the Necessity of an Annex
On January 1, 2000, GATS negotiations were officially
launched as scheduled.345 This new trade round was initiated
at a Declaration during the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Oatar in November 2001 (Doha Round).346 Currently, maritime transport services are included in this Round
under GATS negotiations along with all other service sectors.347
In an early phase of the Doha Round, the developed and
the developing countries expressed their common interest in
maritime transport services.348 In October 2000, the European
Community prompted a joint statement specifically dealing
342

Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on the Meeting of 6-7 April 1995, S/NGMTS/5, at 8, ¶ 36 (the Chairman of the NGMTS
pointing out the process could be plurilateral, multilateral or bilateral in
character to enhance greater transparency and legal certainty; Note on the
Meeting of 30 October-1 November 1995, S/NGMTS/7, at 2, ¶. 8. The inclusion
of GATS under the WTO framework started from the successful bilateral negotiations between the EC and US; See also, Note on the Meeting of 5 and 8
December 1995, S/NGMTS/8, (Jan. 5, 1996), at 1-2, ¶ 6 (the Chairman of the
NGMTS placed great emphasis on the need for the participants to intensify
the bilateral negotiations accompanying the multilateral negotiations;, Note
on the Meeting of 13 and 16 February 1996, S/NGMTS/9, (Mar. 8, 1996), at
1,¶. 5 (considering the bilateral negotiations as useful and candid by the US
delegation).
343
Council for Trade In Services, Maritime Transport Services Background Note by Secretariat, S/C/W/315, (Jun.7, 2010) at 36, ¶126 .
344
Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Note on the Meeting of 26 and 29 March 1996, S/NGMTS/10, (Apr. 11, 1996), at 1 (mentioning
the NGMTS negotiations that the combination of bilateral and multilateral
negotiations).
345
See GATS, supra note 17, at 19.
346
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1 (2001).
347
WTO, Service Negotiations, (Jul. 12, 2012),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/s_negs_e.htm.
348
WTO, infra notes 349 and 350.
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with maritime transport.349 Later, Japan, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Chile, Australia and Colombia submitted respective negotiation proposals as well. 350 As we have seen, the Doha
Round inherits a request-offer approach from previous negotiations.351 In light of the previous offers, they aimed to reduce, or
even to further eliminate, impediments to the shipping industry and to cultivate a free and fair competitive shipping market
with merely a minimum level of regulation on reducing shipping tariffs thus benefiting consumers from all WTO member
parties.352
The principles of trade in services are contained in the
GATS, including maritime transport service sectors. 353 The
specific regime for maritime transport services in the negotiations is defined by decision.354 The “Guidelines and Procedures
for the Negotiations on Trade in Services” at paragraph 11
claims that “Liberalization shall be advanced through bilateral,
plurilateral or multilateral negotiations […]”.355 After the Hong
Kong 2005 Ministerial Conference, the rigidness of harmonization on maritime transport services is amended with certain
flexibilities with regard to countries at different stage of devel349

Council For Trade in Services, Joint Statement from the European
Community and their Member States, Hong Kong, Japan, Republic of Korea,
Norway and Singapore: The Negotiations on Maritime Transport Services,
S/CSS/W/8, (Oct. 6, 2006), ¶¶ 3-5, (announcing their ambition for real and
meaningful liberalization in shipping).
350
See Council For Trade in Services, Communication from the European
Communities and Their Member States: GATS 2000: Transport Services,
S/CSS/W/41, (Dec.22, 2000), at 8; Communication from Japan: The Negotiations on Trade in Services, S/CSS/W/42, (Dec. 22, 2000), at 10-11; Communication from Norway: The Negotiations on Trade in Services, S/CSS/W/59,
(Mar. 21, 2001), at 6; Communication from Republic of Korea: Negotiating
Proposal for Maritime Transport Services, S/CSS/W/87, (May 11, 2001), at 1;
Communication from Chile: The Negotiations on Trade in Services,
S/CSS/W/88, (May 14, 2001), at 3; Communication from Australia: Negotiating Proposal for Maritime Transport Services, S/CSS/W/111, (Oct. 1, 2001), at
1; Communication from Colombia - Negotiating Proposal for Maritime
Transport Services, S/CSS/W/123, (Nov. 27, 2001), at 1.
351
Uruguay Round and NGMTS Negotiations in Section IV.A-B; See, e.g.,
supra notes 323, 325, 330-33.
352
Council for Trade in Services, supra notes 349-50.
353
WTO, supra note 347.
354
Council For Trade in Services, Decisions on Maritime Transport Services, S/L/24, (Jul. 3, 1996).
355
Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Guidelines and
Procedures for the Negotiations on Trade in Services, S/L/93, (Mar. 29, 2003).
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opment.356
A substantial advance in the Doha Round negotiations is
that absence of a US offer on the maritime transport sector has
not frozen the multilateral negotiations. Until 2003, the United
States had not included any specific commitment on maritime
transport service 357 because the inclusion of the maritime
transport into GATS/WTO negotiations under the Doha Round
would reduce US flexibility on whether to undertake counteract. 358 The inclusion means that the breach of WTO maritime
transport will be a subject under the dispute settlement apparatus, instead of by any unilateral retaliatory measure, in addition that the US would be subject to the WTO dispute settlement system concerning maritime transport issues. 359
Moreover, the US’s hesitation caused negative reactions from
other countries, particularly developing countries, such as India and Brazil towards handing in any comprehensive and substantial offers in the sector.360 Even so, developing countries
have learnt not to rely heavily on the US attitude. There are an
increasing number of developing countries that have made
substantial commitments on maritime transport, including India and Brazil. 361 As a result, the Doha Round has been developed without heavy reliance on the US offers like the NGMTS
negotiations (1994-1996).
Unlike the NGMTS specific forum, the Doha Round is
problematic owing to lack of a specialized maritime transport
negotiation platform. Although the Korean delegation hinted
356

World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December
2005: Doha Work Programme, WT/MIN(05)/DEC, Annex C, at C-2, ¶ 3, 5 (on
the more forms of negotiations and more flexibility for less developed countries); see also Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl and Pierre Sauvé, supra note 70,
at 153.
357
Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Communication
from the US: Initial Offer, TN/S/O/USA, (Apr.9, 2003), at 93.
358
See PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 320-21, n.1508 (The Chairman
of the US Federal Maritime Commission expressed concerns that “the Commission’s authority to move unilaterally to counteract the laws and actions of
foreign government is unique. […] this is an important authority and the
Commission is judicious in its use. Had the US agreed to include maritime
services in the World Trade Organization, the Commission would have lost
this authority and not been able to take these actions”).
359
DSU Article 2.
360
WTO, Members and Observers, supra note 52.
361
PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 339-41.
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that it was necessary to found the NGMTS-like negotiation forum, a specialized negotiation forum on merely maritime
transport has not been established.362 The General Council of
Services decided to undertake maritime transport negotiations
along with all other services sectors.363 Firstly, it is unlikely for
negotiators to be equipped with adequate knowledge in this
sector due to the perplexing nature of sea transport.
Moreover, the mixed negotiations mean the sea transport
sector encounters trade-off risks from other sectors. The cross
sectoral/sectional trade-off bargaining practices existed in the
previous WTO negotiations. This practice was widely manipulated by negotiators in their bargaining procedure in the transformation from the GATT system to the WTO system.364 From
the perspective of a governmental negotiator, the overall service trade of the country gained an upper hand over domestic
shipping industry only.365 Due to the lesser economic and political importance of the shipping industry compared with a country’s overall services economy, the maritime transport sector
faced a challenge from the trade-off process. 366 Despite the
acknowledgement of the essential importance achieved through
GATT as to trade of goods, shipowners’ associations in different
countries might fear that the inclusion of maritime services negotiations in this framework is paralleled with all other sectoral/sectional services bears the risk of cross-sectoral/sectional
trade-off problem.367 The problem will remain outstanding unless the maritime transport is negotiated separately as a specific service sector; the agreements achieved in the independent
negotiations will form a GATS annex.
Additionally, a request-offer approach used in the Doha
362
Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Korea Delegation’s Proposal, S/CSS/W/87, (May 11, 2001), at ¶5.
363
Id.
364
See Jackson, supra note 40, at 48.
365
PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 252-53, 346-48.
366
Id.
367
See CENSA, GATT Rules for Sea Transport: CENSA Position Paper
(May 1984), at 2; BIAC, BIAC Statement to the OECD Maritime Transport
Committee Regarding Maritime Services and the GATT (Jun.23, 1989; International Chamber of Commerce, Liberalization of Services Under the GATT
Uruguay Round, 321/360 (1989), at 2; OECD DAFFE/MTC/87.11(2nd Rev.)
(October 1987), at 7; OECD, Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations on Maritime Transport, DSTI/SI/MTC(94)9, (Mar.1994),
at 2.
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Round bears a risk of creating a negotiation vacuum in WTO
Member’s offers. During 2003, WTO Members submitted a
number of initial offers on all service sectors.368 Among them,
some offers contained meaningfully substantial commitments
on all three pillars of maritime transport, 369 multimodal
transport (referred to sometimes as the fourth pillar), and even
on certain extents of cabotage domestic transport.370 Take the
European Community offer as an example. The European
Community mainly restates its 1996 NGMTS-negotiation offer
with a high extent of liberalization on international shipping
and on cabotage shipping as well.371 So do the offers of New
Zealand, 372 Australia, 373 Canada, 374 Japan, all of whom are
maritime powers.375 Nevertheless, others omitted the shipping
sector in their service GATS commitments entirely. A salient
example was the US offer, which did not include any specific
commitment to the shipping sector.376
Last but not least, it is necessary to unify the system of
classification before the next negotiations. The participants follow various classifications of maritime transport subcategories, so that it is very difficult to precisely identify common and conflicting areas for further negotiations.377 So far, the
diversity of national commitments combine three commonly
used forms of classification systems, mixing the Central Product Classification (CPC) system and services sectoral/sectional
368

See infra notes 360, 376 and 377.
WTO, Notes to the Section on International Maritime Transport Services, TN/S/O/EEC (Jun.10, 2003).
370
Id.
371
Id.
372
Council for Trade in Services Special Session, New Zealand: Initial
Conditioning Offer, TN/S/O/NZL (Mar. 31, 2003).
373
Council for Trade in Services Special Session, Australia: Initial Conditioning Offer, TN/S/O/AUS (Apr. 2, 2003).
374
Council for Trade in Services Special Session, Canada: Initial Conditioning Offer, TN/S/O/CAN (Apr. 4, 2003).
375
Council for Trade in Services Special Session, Japan: Initial Conditioning Offer, TN/S/O/JPN (Apr. 7, 2003).
376
See Council for Trade in Services Special Session, United States: Initial Offer, TN/S/O/USA, (Apr. 9, 2003) at 93; Chile: Initial Offer,
TN/S/O/CHL, (Jul. 16, 2003) at 35-36; Turkey: Initial Offer, TN/S/O/TUR,
(Sep. 3, 2003) at 34-35. The US offer on maritime transport sector was absent.
377
See Council for Trade in Services, Maritime Transport Services Background Note by Secretariat, S/C/W/315, (Jun. 7, 2010).
369
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Classification List, as well as the Maritime Model Schedule
(MMS). 378 The diversity is further perplexed by the fact that
some Members added their own sui generis definitions.379
As of November 2005, WTO members collectively identified
their sectoral/sectional and modal objectives for maritime
transport negotiations.380 Unfortunately, many of the details of
maritime negotiations contained in maritime transport negotiations remain restricted and unavailable for researchers.
The key objective of this new round of maritime negotiations probably puts greater emphasis on developing countries,
which is reflected in many articles in the 2001 Doha Ministeri381
al Declaration. Active participation of China in the WTO negotiations and in the Rotterdam Rules’ negotiations offer various chances for maritime transport service providers from all
over the world to embody the Chinese maritime regime in a
uniform regime under the WTO, in particular the GATS,
framework.
It is worth noting that, within the WTO framework, a multilateral trading and negotiating system, there are a few nonreciprocal elements, albeit they usually erode the unification of
an international transport regime. These exceptions originate
382
from the progressive notion. According to some, these exceptions benefit less developed countries from a fully uniform
GATS transport regime offered by developed member parities
without requiring that the former groups adhere to the uniform
standards at exactly the same degree as that of the later
groups. In fact, it is reasonable to allow this non-reciprocity,
383
because these LDCs are usually negotiating underdogs. Owing to their minor economic importance and unfamiliarity with
384
the WTO rules of play, they cannot act as rule makers.
378

Council for Trade in Services, Maritime Transport Services Background Notes by Secretariat, MTN/GNS/W/120, (Jun. 7, 2010).
379
See Council for Trade in Services, supra note 378, at 36, ¶136.
380
See WTO,
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/tn/s/23.doc, accessed Jan. 26, 2013.
381
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001), at ¶¶ 2, 3, 9, 15 and 16.
382
GATS, supra note 17, at Part IV “Progressive Liberalization”
383
PARAMESWARAN, supra note 154, at 252-53, 346-48.
384
See WTO, Less-Developed Countries, http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm, accessed Sep. 30, 2013.
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This merit distinguishes the WTO from other international
organizations, contributing to the active engagement of the developing world. Thus, while it is important to strive for substantial unification in all major maritime powers from both the
industrialized and developing world, the absence of GATS offers on all three pillars of sea transport sectors and multimodal
transport from some will not inevitably result in the overall
failure of GATS maritime negotiations. If the unification is
achieved through a progressive process, the developing countries can tender substantial offers, which meet high standards
but will be realized through progressive phrases. On balance,
the aim of the developed world, for instance the U.S., cannot be
achieved without considerations on the reluctance of the developing world.
D. Reopening of Maritime Transport Negotiations
under the WTO Framework
Based on the historical and doctrinal analyses of maritime
transport negotiations within the WTO framework, the thesis
argues that it is feasible to reopen the maritime transport related negotiations within the WTO framework now. The legal
setting today is different from it was, and the WTO has been
much developed since 1995.385 In particular, the TRIPS model
of unifying intellectual property rights has become full-fledged
after approximately 20 years’ development. The TRIPS model
has proved that the WTO is able to unify a fragmented area of
law,386 and this will reduce the concerns of negotiators against
opening of maritime transport negotiations. In addition, the
nature of unifying intellectual property right regimes and unifying seaborne cargo regimes are almost the same. Thus, the
success of the WTO in the TRIPS model provides the international community a feasible way to unify seaborne cargo rules.
Moreover, the interest parties have recognized the increasing
importance of maritime transport negotiations, such as in the
US and other developing countries.387 Chapter Seven will ad385

See supra Sec. IV (A) and (B).
See supra Sec. III: Cooperation between the WTO and the UN
387
See supra Sec. IV (B) and (C). For further details in how to remove barriers to maritime transport negotiations in Lijun Zhao, Soft or Hard law: Effective Implementation of Uniform Sea Transport Rules through the World
Trade Organization Framework, INT’L ORG. L. R., 172-227 (2014).	
  
386
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dress how to remove possible barriers to negotiations and the
implementation of uniform maritime transport rules.
V. CONCLUSION
Traditionally, sea transport law is governed by conventions. Its harmonization has been negotiated under the UN
framework; most notably in the Hamburg Rules and recently in
the Rotterdam Rules since the 1970s. Unfortunately, these two
UN conventions have had difficulties in achieving worldwide
ratification in so far so as to form a uniform sea transport regime. Owing to the successful incorporation of another privateright area of intellectual property into its framework, the WTO
is likely to cooperate with the UN to foster a uniform sea
transport regime and to address the issues on unification and
liberalization in one go under the WTO’s GATS annex. Furthermore, the WTO is an influential worldwide organization
built upon comprehensive documents and complete legal
framework.
The unification of seaborne transport is feasible under the
GATS, since the WTO has successfully created a uniform IP
regime under TRIPS. On the whole, the WTO possesses at least
five advantages in boosting the pace of unification of the sea
transport regime. First, it has the successful precedent of cooperation with the UN’s WIPO in IP regime which can be followed in the sea transport regime. Second, the WTO’s unique
way under TRIPS of dealing with the WTO agreements and
pre-existing international treaties on IP will shed light on the
potential reference to previous sea cargo conventions, including
the UN Hamburg and Rotterdam Rules to the GATS and its
annex. Third, the WTO has developed a theory of balancing
rights for the conflicting interest groups from TRIPS and will
apply it to the maritime transport uniform law negotiations.
Fourth, the WTO can establish minimum standards under its
GATS to maintain the criteria of unification for sea transport
as does TRIPS. Fifth, the WTO institution is effectively implemented under an enforcement procedure under a dispute settlement system. Based on these five merits, the endeavours to
unify sea transport law will be increasingly accelerated with
WTO and UN cooperation.
The relationship between the WTO and maritime
transport regime can be traced backwards to GATS negotia-
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tions which contained maritime transport negotiations. In light
of the history of the GATS-based maritime transport negotiations from the 1980s to today, there has been demonstrated a
trend subject to both progression and regression. Since the
Uruguay Round, maritime transport services have been integrated into the WTO negotiations for the first time. The necessity of its inclusion had been challenged and confirmed in the
NGMTS negotiations from 1994 to 1996. The progress achieved
during this period includes the formation of the specific negotiation forum and a statistical approach based on a wide range of
questionnaires. Also, it explores a pre-bilateral approach combined with multilateral negotiations to address the problem of
absence of substantial offers from importance entities, such as
the US. In order to continue the NGMTS achievements, a significant drawback in the current Doha Round, namely the lack
of a special negotiation platform for maritime transport services, should be removed. This is because seaborne transport
bears trade-off risks, which require an independent negotiations forum and a special annex.
On the whole, the maritime negotiations within the world
trading system are divided into three stages in Section V: the
Uruguay Round (1986-1994), the NGMTS (1994-1997) and Doha Round (2000- ). From the progress and regress within the
three-stage negotiations, there are primarily three lessons
learned which shed lights to future uniformity of maritime
transport regimes. The first lesson is that the dual approach
introduced within the Uruguay Round, has the beneficiary effects of expanding the participation of maritime negotiations,
and of shrinking the trade-off problem. This dual approach was
continued in the NGMTS negotiations; however, the Doha
Round negotiations have not maintained it. Future maritime
negotiations should maintain this dual approach in designing
negotiating forums and concluding the negotiating results in
an independent instrument (e.g. an annex) exclusively for maritime transport sector.
The second lesson regards the ways to engage a number of
private participants in the shipping industry. In light of the
NGMTS negotiations, in order to foster communications between the shipping industry and rule makers, future negotiations should consult non-government entities (e.g. shipowners’
council and shippers’ alliances). In future negotiations, the
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form of their participation is not restricted to the role of observers. For instance, the WTO can hold workshops similar to
those the OECD currently holds and allow respective private
388
parties to hear and speak out there.
The third lesson is on the merits of conducting empirical
research on maritime transport.389 The questionnaire conducted by the NGMTS on the maritime transport is a worthwhile
endeavor due to the general lack of worldwide statistical da390
ta concerning the seaborne transport service sector today.
391
Even though the questionnaire was conducted in 1994, and
392
some information is obsolete, a number of results are still
worthy of attention in today’s harmonized system.393 Cabotage
394
is generally excluded from sea transport negotiations. That
indicates that negotiators are very conservative on transportation within their Member’s territories. Similarly, the multimodal transport might be a tough issue because of its inland
transport legs. Thus, further GATS negotiations may discuss
cabotage and multimodal transport issues but cannot harmonize them at the beginning stages of maritime negotiations.
Moreover, the unification of sea cargo regulation under the
GATS already had been initiated by a WTO member’s response
concerning the minimum standardization of transport service
395
and conditions of carriage. Accordingly, it is also worthwhile
388

E.g. OECD, Workshop: Measuring the potential of green growth in
Chile (Santiago, Chile),
http://www.oecd.org/chile/lowcarbonworkshopchile.htm, accessed Feb. 25,
2013 (the OECD engages individuals, intergovernmental and nongovernment organizations in its workshops).
389 See supra Sec. IV (B).
390
Council for Trade in Services, Background Note By Secretariat,
S/C/W/62 (Nov.16, 1998), at 1-2. The United States triggers the endeavor for
collecting statistical information in a worldwide spectrum and unique unprecedented as to world registered tonnage and ownership to be the factual
basis of further shipping negotiations.
391
Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, supra note 296.
392
See also WTO, infra note 392. E.g. Question 9 of the questionnaire on
the information collected on the United Nations Code of Conduct for liner
Conferences.
393
Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services, supra note 296, at 1.
394
See WTO, supra note 301; e.g. WTO, Communication from CyprusResponse to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services,
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.8, (Feb.6, 1995), at 3.
395
Negotiating Group on Maritime Transport Services, Communication
from Australia-Response to Questionnaire on Maritime Transport Services,
S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.4, (Jan. 24, 1995), at 8 and 12-13; Negotiating Group on
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of conducting a similar questionnaire in the further to obtain
396
more first-hand information.
The last lesson is the introduction of the supplementary
mechanisms, designed in the Uruguay Round and NGMTS negotiations, may avid tugs of war in negotiations. The two supplementary mechanisms, used in the NGMTS and Doha Round
negotiations, for multilateral negotiations are helpful to solve
disagreements, namely procedural rules of negotiations and bilateral negotiations. In order to avoid the deadlock of tugs of
war in the next negotiations, it might be necessary to impose
deadlines for all participants to submit offers.
Therefore, having been an important part of the negotiating agenda in the Uruguay Round, the NGMTS, and the Doha
Round, maritime transport may be concluded within an annex
to the GATS with reference to selected pre-existing conventions. Besides unification, the WTO will also need to tackle
some shipping-related issues, because they are all components
of the GATS-based annex on maritime transport.

Maritime Transport Services, Communication from Canada-Supplementary
Information on the Canadian Response to Questionnaire on Maritime
Transport Services, S/NGMTS/W/2/Add.5/Suppl1, (Feb.24,1995), at 2 (mentioning standards to health in transport).
396
Background Note By Secretariat, supra note 390. The problem of the
statistical data vacuum on shipping has been recognized since the Uruguay
Round.
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